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Prevalent internet marketplaces and crowdsourcing platforms have started fac-
ing new computational challenges. In point of fact, these challenges exist mostly
due to the strategic behavior of users, the stochastic nature of these platforms,
their real-time computations, and the demand for incorporating the large-scale
users data. With these challenges in front of the mechanism designer, the job
of the field of algorithmic mechanism design is to find new ways of tackling
them. Having this objective in mind, my dissertation is taking a closer look
into various aspects of mechanism design for (real-world) applications suffer-
ing from the aforementioned challenges. We informally refer to such applica-
tions as complex environments. In this dissertation, we particularly show how to
develop general reductions from mechanism design to algorithm design, how
to develop and analyze simple mechanisms for trade, and finally how to learn
optimal revenue mechanisms in an online fashion by interacting with users in
several rounds. Throughout this dissertation, we point out how we Incorpo-
rate techniques and ideas from combinatorial optimization, learning theory and
applied probability to obtain our results.
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1.1 Mechanism Design: the Past and Future
The world around us has become an interconnected network of economic and
computational systems that have been broadly used by human users. As a result
of this development, and due to strategic behavior of users of these systems, the
need to design algorithms that are working properly with strategic input has
emerged. Such algorithms are called mechanisms, and the discipline of designing
such algorithms is widely known as algorithmic mechanism design. We consider
mechanism design with money, i.e. when the designer is allowed to charge each
user with a monetary payment. These payments will help the designer to control
the strategic behavior of utility-maximizing users.
The applications of algorithmic mechanism design by giant web companies
has spurred the development of the field. In fact, mechanism design, and al-
gorithmic game theory more generally, have found major roles in designing and
analyzing several fundamental components of the last decade’s web platforms
and search engines. The most canonical example is the advertisement auction,
a.k.a. ad-auction, which "still seems to be the undisputed queen of killer applica-
tions of algorithmic game theory" (Nisan, 2010). However, the field of algorithmic
mechanism design is continuing to advance, as web-based computational eco-
nomic platforms are growing more and more, and it constantly finds new, yet
more complex, applications beyond ad-auction.
More recently, prevalent internet marketplaces and crowdsourcing plat-
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forms such as ride-sharings (e.g. Uber), online freelancing markets (e.g. Up-
work), internet sale services (e.g. eBay), and cloud computing pricing mech-
anisms (e.g. Microsoft Cloud) have started facing new rising computational
challenges. In point of fact, these challenges exist mostly due to the strategic
behavior of users, the stochastic nature of these platforms, their real-time com-
putations, and the demand for incorporating the large-scale user data. With
these challenges in front of the mechanism designer, the job of the field is to
find new ways of tackling them. Having this objective in mind, this dissertation
is taking a closer look into various aspects of (real-world) applications suffering
from the aforementioned challenges. We informally refer to such applications
as complex environments.
While current methods from theoretical computer science are broadly am-
plifying our understanding of many of these studied settings, we still require
substantially new techniques from probability theory, combinatorial optimization
and statistical learning to address many of the challenges in a complex environ-
ment. As part of these explorations, in this dissertation we aim to view several
of these emerging challenges from different perspectives, and incorporate ideas
from the mentioned areas of mathematics to find adequate solutions.
1.2 Towards Modern Mechanisms in Complex Environments
This dissertation gravitates towards problems with an emphasis on the themes
of handling strategic user misbehavior, simplicity of mechanisms and mechanisms with
online input. By the same token, it exploits - and sometimes develops - new tools
that are applicable to problems under these three themes by mingling them with
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classic ideas from game theory, learning theory and theory of online algorithms.
We elaborate more on each of these themes individually. For each one of them
we explain what research questions have been solved, and how providing ade-
quate solutions to those questions will guide us towards designing better mech-
anisms for complex environments.
1.2.1 Incentive Compatibility and User Misbehavior
A striking goal of computer science research in incentive compatible mechanism
design is to understand the extent to which "strategic" efficient computation is
less powerful than "non-strategic" efficient computation. Incentive compatibil-
ity of a mechanism requires that, though agents could misreport their prefer-
ences, it is not in any agent’s best interest to do so. A key goal then is to design
a computationally efficient procedure for transforming any algorithm into an in-
centive compatible mechanism with little or no loss in expected social welfare 1,
a procedure also known as black-box reduction for welfare. This gives an affirma-
tive answer to the question of whether algorithms’ performance guarantees are
robust (up to an efficient reduction) in the presence of users’ misbehavior.
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, we resolve a five-year-old open question
in this area: there is a polynomial time reduction from Bayesian 2 incentive
compatible mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design for welfare max-
imization problems. This in turn shows the robustness to strategic behavior in
Bayesian mechanism design, and indeed is a surprising victory for Bayesian
1In a mechanism design setting, each user has some specific value for any picked outcome
by the mechanism. The total generated value after assigning an outcome is commonly refereed
to as "social welfare".
2In a Bayesian setting, the valuations of the users are assumed to be drawn independently
from common-knowledge prior distributions.
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welfare optimization.
Unlike prior results, our reduction achieves exact incentive compatibility for
problems with multidimensional and continuous type spaces. It turned out a
key technical barrier preventing exact incentive compatibility in prior black-box
reductions is giving a polynomial time algorithm to exactly sample from a distri-
bution over outcomes that is a function of expectations of a set of input distribu-
tions, given only sample access to those input distributions. We overcome this
barrier by employing and generalizing Bernoulli Factories, a compelling toolbox
in applied probability that describes how to generate new random coins from
old ones only by sampling. Finally, we incorporate techniques from online con-
vex optimization and learning theory to demonstrate how efficient algorithms
under the above mentioned computation model generate Bayesian black-box
reductions.
1.2.2 The Need for Simple Mechanisms
One of the important aspects of mechanism design for complex real world envi-
ronments such as ride sharing, online retail and cloud computing is the fact that
the final mechanism will have human users. Accordingly, in most of these de-
sign scenarios it is critical to design mechanisms that are understandable by the
users and have few parameters. Such mechanisms are informally called simple
mechanisms. Interestingly, mechanisms for selling goods - commonly refereed
to as auctions - that are considered to be simple are at the same time easy to opti-
mize. As a result, especially for the objective of maximizing the revenue 3 of the
3In a mechanism design setting, the total collected payments by the auctioneer is commonly
refereed to as "revenue".
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designer, these mechanisms gained a lot of prevalence in electronic commerce.
The quintessential examples are various forms of pricing mechanisms that are
used for different electronic markets, e.g. selling items in online retails or selling
computational resources in cloud computing platforms.
However, the theory of microeconomics, particularly the phenomenal work
of Myerson (1981), proves more complicated forms for optimal revenue auc-
tions in most of these settings. The mystery of this discrepancy between simple
mechanisms used in practice versus optimal ones predicted by the theory initi-
ates the following question: are there simple mechanisms whose performance
is a good approximation to that of the optimal one? Chapter 4 of this disserta-
tion tackles this question, as a continuation to great prior work on this subject
initiated by Hartline and Roughgarden (2009). In particular, we look at simple
pricing mechanisms for the single-item sale.
Consider the problem of selling one item to independent but non-identical
buyers. A surprising result of Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) shows that
using a universal price, a.k.a. anonymous pricing, guarantees no worse than a 4-
approximation and it cannot be better than a 2-approximation for revenue max-
imization. The question of resolving the tight approximation factor (a number
between 2 and 4) has remained open for the last half decade. In this disser-
tation, we make progress on this open problem by comparing the revenue of
anonymous pricing to a standard upper bound on optimal revenue known as
ex-ante pricing revenue. We prove that the worst-case ratio between these two
quantities is e and our result is tight. A corollary of this theorem is the improved
upper bounds by e (from 4) on the worst-case approximation factor of anony-
mous reserves and anonymous pricing with respect to the optimal auction. We
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also prove anonymous pricing cannot approximate the optimal revenue by a
factor better than 2.23, which improves on the known lower bound of 2. The
corollary relating anonymous pricing to the optimal auction also has implica-
tions on mechanism design for agents with multi-dimensional preferences (e.g.,
for multiple items; cf. Chawla et al. (2007)).
1.2.3 Online Nature and User Data
The traditional approach of microeconomic theory towards market design is to
look at static settings, where all the agents/users are available during the trade
and the market is not dynamic at all. However, in many real-world complex
environments for mechanism design, e.g. airline pricing, ride sharing, or cloud
service mechanisms, these assumptions are too simplistic. Indeed, these ap-
plications require an appropriate treatment that considers the online nature of
these problems, e.g. users arrive over time and the trade happens in an online
fashion, and takes into account the history of past trades to learn more about fu-
ture trades. This provides an opportunity to incorporate techniques and ideas
borrowed from online learning, i.e. the art of designing algorithms that make de-
cisions on the fly and learn from past interactions, to design online mechanisms.
On a similar topic, designing near-optimal mechanisms with only samples
from users’ type distributions (rather than distributions themselves) is one of
the emerging challenges of mechanism design for complex environments, due
to the importance of incorporating users’ data instead of prior information. As a
canonical example, there has been great initial work by Cole and Roughgarden
(2014) and Dhangwatnotai et al. (2014) to address the sample complexity of single-
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item revenue maximization. The objective of this line of work is to find out how
many samples from buyers’ distributions are needed to design near-optimal
auctions. In Cole and Roughgarden (2014); Devanur et al. (2016); Huang et al.
(2015) matching upper and lower sample complexity bounds for various auc-
tions design problems have been proved, where these bounds are polynomials
of the number n of buyers and  > 0 (so that a (1 − )-approximation of the
optimal revenue is achievable).
As mentioned earlier, many of the complex environments for mechanism
design need online mechanisms. So, despite the success of the line of work
on sample complexity of offline auctions, there is still an important research
challenge stemming from a discrepancy between these results and the reality in
many applications: holding all the samples in advance, versus collecting sam-
ples over time as the sequence of auctions progresses. In fact, online samples
over time model an online market in which users arrive over time, rather than
users being static. Now, the offline sample complexity problem requires a refor-
mulation, where the objective is to design mechanisms that in the fastest time
possible (i.e. minimum number of online samples) can achieve near-optimal
revenue. In other words, we need online mechanisms with fast convergence rate.
In Chapter 5 of this dissertation, we start exploring the aforementioned chal-
lenge by using online learning theory. We consider an online version of the
same problem when samples are chosen adversarially in an online fashion, and
the seller runs a new auction every time a new sample arrives. Now, the main
question is whether we can learn the optimal-in-hindsight auction in T rounds
to get a (1− )-approximation with respect to this benchmark, while T is a poly-
nomial in the number of bidders n and  > 0. In the full-information case, very
7
surprisingly, we answer in the affirmative by proposing online learning algo-
rithms for the single buyer case or multiple buyer case that achieve optimal
polynomial upper-bounds for T , i.e. matching known offline sample complex-
ity bounds. In our results in Chapter 5, the optimal learnability of the optimal
revenue auction is a byproduct of expert-specific low-regret online learning al-
gorithms, which we refer to as multi-scale online learning. The multi-scale online
learning framework, which we will elaborate more in Chapter 5, should be also
of independent interest for the theoretical machine learning community.
1.3 Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we review and intro-
duce some tools and definitions that will act as the bedrock of future chapters.
In Chapter 3 we discuss our treatment for handling incentive compatibility in
complex environments, and explain how Bayesian welfare-maximizing mecha-
nism design can be reduced to Bayesian welfare-maximizing algorithm design.
In Chapter 4 we discuss simple vs. optimal mechanism design, and show how
the simple anonymous pricing can be a constant approximation to the optimal
revenue auction for single-item sale (under mild distributional assumptions).
Finally, in Chapter 5 we discuss online mechanism design and show how on-
line learning theory can be used to complement the line of work on sample
complexity of offline auctions.
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2.1 General Basics of Bayesian Mechanism Design
Multi-parameter Bayesian setting. Suppose there are n agents, where agent k
has private type tk from type space T k. The type profile of all agents is denoted by
t = (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ T 1 × . . . × T n. Moreover, we assume types are drawn indepen-
dently from known prior distributions. For agent k, let Fk be the distribution of
tk ∈ T k and F = F1 × . . . × Fn be the joint distribution of types. Suppose there
is an outcome space denoted by O. Agent k with type tk has valuation v(tk, o) for
outcome o ∈ O, where v : (T 1 ∪ . . . ∪ T n) × O → [0, 1] is a fixed function. Note
that we assume agent values are non-negative. In particular, in Chapter 3 we
assume w.l.o.g. that values are bounded and in [0, 1], and in Chapter 5 we as-
sume values are bounded and in the range [1, h] unless noted otherwise. Finally,
we allow charging agents with non-negative money payments and we assume
agents are quasi-linear, i.e. an agent with private type t has utility u = v(t, o) − p
for the outcome-payment pair (o, p).
Algorithms, mechanisms and interim rules. An allocation algorithm A is a
mapping from type profiles t to outcome space O. A (direct revelation) mecha-
nism M is a pair of allocation rule and payment rule (A,p), in which A is an al-
location algorithm and p = (p1, . . . , pn) where each pk (denoted by the payment
rule for agent k) is a mapping from type profiles t to R+. In fact, one can think
of the interaction between strategic agents and a mechanism as follows: agents
submit their reported types s = (s1, . . . , sn) and then the mechanismM picks the
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outcome o = A(s) and charges each agent k with its payment pk(s). We also
consider interim allocation rule, which is the allocation from the perspective of
one agent when the other agent’s types are drawn from their prior distribution.
More concretely, we abuse notation and define Ak(sk) , A(sk, t−k) to be the dis-
tribution over outcomes induced byAwhen agent k’s type is sk and other agent










most parts of this dissertation, we focus only on one agent, e.g. agent k, and we
just work with the interim allocation algorithm Ak(.). When it is clear from the
context, we drop the agent’s superscript, and therefore A(s) denotes the distri-
bution over outcomes induced byA(s, t−k) when t−k ∼ F−k.
Bayesian and dominant strategy truthfulness. We are mostly interested in de-
signing mechanisms that are interim truthful (a.k.a. Bayesian truthful), i.e. every
agent is best off by reporting her true type assuming all other agents’ reported
types are drawn independently from their prior type distributions. More pre-
cisely, a mechanismM is Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) if for all agents k,










As a stronger notion of truthfulness than Bayesian truthfulness, one can con-
sider dominant strategy truthfulness. More precisely, a mechanismM is Dominant
Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC) if for all agents k, and all types sk, tk ∈ T k
and all types t−k ∈ T −k,
v(tk,A(t)) − pk(t) ≥ v(tk,A(sk, t−k)) − pk(sk, t−k) (2.2)
1We use the notational convention that a superscript or subscript “−k" denotes omitting the
k-th element of an n-tuple.
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Moreover, an allocation algorithm A˜ is said to be BIC (or DSIC) if there exists a
payment rule p˜ such that M˜ = (A˜, p˜) is a BIC (or DSIC) mechanism. Throughout
this dissertation, we use the terms Bayesian (or dominant strategy) truthful and
Bayesian (or dominant strategy) incentive compatible interchangeably. For ran-
domized mechanisms, DSIC and BIC solution concepts are defined by consid-
ering expectation of utilities of agents over mechanism’s internal randomness.
Social welfare. In Chapter 3, we are considering mechanism design for max-
imizing social welfare, i.e. the sum of the utilities of agents and the mechanism
designer. For quasi-linear agents, this quantity is in fact the sum of the valua-
tions of the agents under the outcome picked by the mechanism. For the allo-
cation algorithm A, we use the notation val(A) for the expected welfare of this
allocation and valk(A) for the expected value of agent k under this allocation,








. If a mechanism
maximizes social welfare, it is called an efficient mechanism.
Revenue of the Auctioneer. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we are consider-
ing mechanism design for maximizing auctioneer’s expected revenue, i.e. the ex-
pected sum of payments collected from agents by the principal who runs the
mechanism. The expectation is normally taken over mechanism’s internal ran-
domness, and also the randomness of agent types. For mechanism M= (A,p),





. If a (Bayesian) mechanism maximizes the generated
revenue, it is called an optimal or Bayesian optimal mechanism.
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Single-item Bayesian setting. In the special case of a single-item environ-
ment, we assume there are n agents and there is a single item that can only
be sold to one of these agents. Each agent k has a private value vk for the item,
which is drawn from a distribution Fk with cumulative distribution function
(CDF) denoted by Fk(·). In a direct revelation auction for the single-item setting,
the agents submit their reported values, a.k.a. bids, to the mechanism. The
mechanism, a.k.a. the auction, then allocates the item to one of the bidders and
charges each agent k with a payment pk.
Revenue curves and regular instances. In a Bayesian single-item setting, the
revenue curve Ri(q) = q ·F−1i (1− q) gives the expected revenue obtained by selling
an item to agent i with probability exactly q, i.e., by posting price F−1i (1− q). The
agent is regular if its revenue curve Ri(q) is concave in q. An n-agent instance
I = {Fi}ni=1 is regular if each agent’s distribution is regular. The family of all
regular instances for all n ≥ 1 is denoted by REG.
2.2 Basics and Notations Specific for Chapter 3
In Chapter 3, we heavily incorporate a tool from applied probability that is
called Bernoulli factory. In this section, we introduce this toolbox by provid-
ing some basic notations and reviewing basic results from the literature. We
will build parts of our result in Chapter 3 on top of these basic, yet important,
results. We recommend referring back to this section concurrent with reading
Chapter 3.
13
Bernoulli factory problem. Throughout this dissertation, we use the terms
Bernoulli and coin to refer to distributions over {1, 0} and {heads,tails}, inter-
changeably. The Bernoulli factory problem is about generating new coins from
old ones.
Definition 2.2.1 (Keane and O’Brien, 1994). Given function f : (0, 1) → (0, 1),
the Bernoulli factory problem is to output a sample of a Bernoulli variable with
bias f (p) (i.e. an f (p)-coin), given black-box access to independent samples of a
Bernoulli distribution with bias p ∈ (0, 1) (i.e. a p-coin). 2
To illustrate the Bernoulli factory model, consider the examples of f (p) = p2
and f (p) = ep−1. For the former one, it is enough to flip the p-coin twice and
output 1 if both flips are 1, and 0 otherwise. For the latter one, the Bernoulli
factory is still simple but more interesting: draw K from the Poisson distribution
with parameter λ = 1, flip the p-coin K times and output 1 if all coin flips where
1, and 0 otherwise (see below).3 The question of characterizing functions f for
which there is an algorithm for sampling f (p)-coins from p-coins has been the
main subject of interest in this literature (Keane and O’Brien, 1994; Nacu and
Peres, 2005). In particular, Keane and O’Brien (1994) provide necessary and
sufficient conditions for f , under which an algorithm for the Bernoulli factory
exists. Moreover, Nacu and Peres (2005) suggest an algorithm for simulating
an f (p)-coin based on polynomial envelopes of f . The canonical challenging
problem of Bernoulli factories – and a primitive in the construction of more
general Bernoulli factories – is the Bernoulli Doubling problem: f (p) = 2p for
p ∈ (0, 1/2). See Łatuszyn´ski (2010) for a survey on this topic.
2The desired algorithm is also assumed to have access to an unlimited number of samples
from an unbiased coin, or in other words is randomized.
3The Poisson distribution with parameter λ has probability of K = k as λke−λ/k!.
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Questions in Bernoulli factories can be generalized to multiple input coins.
Given f : (0, 1)m → (0, 1), the goal is tom sample from a Bernoulli with bias
f (p1, . . . , pm) given sample access to m independent Bernoulli variables with un-
known biases p = (p1, . . . , pm). Linear functions f were studied and solved by
Huber (2015). For example, the special case m = 2 and f (p1, p2) = p1 + p2, a.k.a.,
Bernoulli Addition, can be solved by reduction to the Bernoulli Doubling problem
(formalized below).
Building blocks to apply Bernoulli factories in mechanism design. Ques-
tions in Bernoulli factories can be generalized to allow input distributions over
real numbers on the unit interval [0, 1] (rather than Bernoullis over {0, 1}). In this
generalization the question is to produce a Bernoulli with bias f (µ) with sam-
ple access to draws from a distribution supported on [0, 1] with expectation µ.
These problems can be easily solved by reduction to the Bernoulli factory prob-
lem. Below we enumerate the important building blocks for Bernoulli factories:
0. Continuous to Bernoulli: One can implement Bernoulli with bias µ with one
sample from distributionDwith expectation µ. Algorithm:
• Draw Z ∼ D and P ∼ Bern[Z].
• Output P.
1. Bernoulli Down Scaling: One can implement f (p) = λ · p for λ ∈ [0, 1] with
one sample from Bern[p]. Algorithm:
• Draw Λ ∼ Bern[λ] and P ∼ Bern[p].
• Output Λ · P (i.e., 1 if both coins are 1, otherwise 0).
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2. Bernoulli Doubling: One can implement f (p) = 2p for p ∈ (0, 1/2 − δ] with
O(1/δ) samples from Bern[p] in expectation. The algorithm is complicated,
see Nacu and Peres (2005).




for distribution D over non-negative integers with EK∼D[K] samples from
Bern[p] in expectation. Algorithm:
• Draw K ∼ D and P1, . . . , PK ∼ Bern[p] (i.e., K samples).
• Output ∏i Pi (i.e., 1 if all K coins are 1, otherwise 0).
4. Bernoulli Exponentiation: One can implement f (p) = exp(λ(p − 1)) for
p ∈ [0, 1] and non-negative constant λ with λ samples from Bern[p] in ex-
pectation. Algorithm: Apply the Bernoulli Probability Generating Func-
tion algorithm for the Poisson distribution with parameter λ.
5. Bernoulli Averaging: One can implement f (p1, p2) = (p1 + p2)/2 with one
sample from Bern[p1] or Bern[p2]. Algorithm:
• Draw Z ∼ Bern[1/2], P1 ∼ Bern[p1], and P2 ∼ Bern[p2].
• Output PZ+1.
6. Bernoulli Addition: One can implement f (p1, p2) = p1 + p2 for p1 + p2 ∈
[0, 1 − δ] with O(1/δ) samples from Bern[p1] and Bern[p2] in expectation.
Algorithm: Apply Bernoulli Doubling to Bernoulli Averaging.
It may seem counterintuitive that Bernoulli Doubling is much more chal-
lenging than Bernoulli Down Scaling. Notice, however, that for a coin with bias
p = 1/2, Bernoulli Doubling with a finite number of coin flips is impossible. The
doubled coin must be deterministically heads, while any finite sequence of coin
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flips of Bern[1/2] has non-zero probability of occuring. On the other hand a coin
with bias p = 1/2− δ for some small δ has a similar probability of each sequence
but Bernoulli Doubling must sometimes output tails. Thus, Bernoulli Doubling
must require a number of coin flips that goes to infinity as δ goes to zero.
2.3 Basics and Notations Specific for Chapter 4
In Chapter 4 of this dissertation, we compare various simple mechanisms for
selling a single item to independent agents in the Bayesian setting, and also use
various benchmarks. Moreover, we make use of a particular class of distribu-
tions in our analysis, which we call triangular revenue curve distribution. We elab-
orate on these definitions, notations and mechanisms below. We recommend
referring back to this section concurrent with reading Chapter 4.
Anonymous pricings. In a Bayesian single-item setting, an anonymous pric-
ing is a mechanism that posts a price p that is bought by an arbitrary agent
whose value is at least the posted price (if one exists). The expected revenue of
the anonymous pricing p for instance I = {Fi}ni=1 is












Ex ante relaxation and optimal auctions. In a Bayesian single-item setting,
and in general in any single dimensional setting where the allocation xk(v) for
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each agent is in {0, 1}, the optimal auction was characterized by Myerson (1981).
In this characterization, for each agent k there exists a mapping φ¯k : R → R
that maps values to (ironed) virtual values. The Myerson optimal auction then
would be maximizing the ironed virtual welfare, i.e.
∑n
k=1 xk(vk)φ¯k(vk), and charging
appropriate incentive compatible payments through Myerson payment rule. This
characterization, though complex, is the foundation of modern auction theory.
In the single-item setting, we also consider a non-implementable mechanism,
called ex ante relaxation, as a relaxation to the optimal auction. The revenue of
the ex ante relaxation, which allocates to one agent in expectation, gives an upper
bound on the revenue of the optimal auction. For any instance I, it can be easily









qi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} .
Triangular revenue curve instances. In Chapter 4, we heavily use distribu-
tions with triangular-shaped revenue curves. A triangular revenue curve distribu-
tion, denoted Tri(v¯, q¯) with parameters v¯ ∈ (0,∞) and q¯ ∈ [0, 1], has a cumulative
density function given by
F(p) =

1 p ≥ v¯
p·(1−q¯)
p·(1−q¯)+v¯q¯ 0 ≤ p < v¯
∀p ∈ R+. (2.6)
The revenue curve corresponding to the above distribution has the form of a
triangle with vertices at (0, 0), (q¯, v¯q¯), and (1, 0) as illustrated in Figure 2.1; the
revenue curve’s concavity implies that the distribution is regular. Note that the









Figure 2.1: Revenue curve of distribution Tri(v¯, q¯).
A triangular revenue curve instance is given by I = {Tri(v¯i, q¯i)}ni=1 with
∑n
i=1 q¯i ≤ 1;
with respect to it the revenue of anonymous pricing p and the ex ante relaxation
are given by















2.4 Basics and Notations Specific for Chapter 5
In Chapter 5 we heavily use a standard algorithm from the online learning lit-
erature called Online Mirror Descent (OMD). In this section, we describe this
algorithm for the basic full-information best-expert online learning problem. We
recommend referring back to this section concurrent with reading Chapter 5.
Full information and bandit information online learning. In the best-expert
problem, there are T discrete time instances t = 1, . . . ,T . We also have an action
set A (we use actions and experts interchangeably). For simplicity, we mainly
consider countable and finite actions/experts sets (although there are some ex-
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ceptions, e.g. Chapter 5, Section 5.3.3). At each time t, given the history of past
actions and rewards, the online algorithm selects an expert it (it can be random-
ized). The adversary then reveals a reward function g(t), and the expected gain




. In the partial information version of this prob-
lem, known as multi-armed bandit problem, the adversary only reveals the reward
of the specific action that has been picked by the algorithm at that round. We
assume the adversary is oblivious, i.e. it picks the entire sequence g(1), . . . , g(T )
adversarially before the game begins.
Online Mirror Descent (OMD) algorithm. Fix an open convex set D and its
closure D¯, which in our case are RA>0 and RA+ respectively, and a closed, convex
action set A ⊂ D¯, which in our case is ∆A, i.e. the set of all probability distribu-
tions over experts in A. At the heart of an OMD algorithm there is a Legendre
function F : D¯ → R, i.e. a strictly convex function that admits continuous first
order partial derivatives on D and limx→D¯\D‖∇F(x)‖ = +∞, where ∇F(.) denotes
the gradient map of F. One can think of OMD as a member of projected gradient
descent algorithms, where the gradient update happens in the dual space ∇F(D)
rather than in primalD, and the projection is defined by using the Bregman diver-
gence associated with F rather than `2-distance.
Definition 2.4.1 (Bregman Divergence). Given a Legendre function F over ∆A,
the Bregman divergence associated with F, denoted as DF : RA × RA → R, is
defined by
DF(x, y) = F(x) − F(y) − (x − y)T∇F(y) .
Definition 2.4.2 (Online Mirror Descent). Suppose F is a Legendre function. At
every time t ∈ [T ], the online mirror descent algorithm with Legendre function
F selects an expert drawn from distribution p(t), and then updates w(t) and p(t)
20
given rewards g(t) by:
Gradient update:
∇F(w(t + 1)) = ∇F(p(t)) + η · g(t)⇒ w(t + 1) = (∇F)−1 (∇F(p(t)) + η · g(t))
(2.9)
Bregman projection:






where η > 0 is called the learning rate of OMD.
We use the following standard regret bound of OMD 4 that compares the gain
of the algorithm with any fixed (randomized) action in hindsight.
Lemma 2.4.1. For any learning rate parameter 0 < η ≤ 1 and any benchmark distri-
bution q over A, the OMD algorithm with Legendre function F(.) admits the following:
∑







t∈[T ] DF(p(t),w(t + 1)) + 1ηDF(q,p(1)) (2.11)
4Refer to Bubeck (2011) for a thorough discussion on OMD. For completeness, a proof is also
provided in the appendix, Section C.1.5
21
CHAPTER 3
REDUCING MECHANISM DESIGN TO ALGORITHM DESIGN
In this chapter, we investigate the computational complexity gap between
Bayesian algorithm design and mechanism design for welfare maximization.
To this end, we start by looking at the problem of Bayesian black-box reductions
in mechanism design. In the black-box computational model, one is willing to
design Bayesian truthful mechanisms while having access to a black-box allo-
cation algorithm. The objective is to design such a mechanism in polynomial
time, i.e. with polynomial (in number of agents) query calls to the black-box
and polynomial extra computation time. Moreover, the designed mechanism
should have negligible loss in expected social welfare compared to the expected
social welfare of the allocation black-box.
Organization of the chapter. In Section 3.1 we define the Bayesian black-box
reduction and review the literature. In Section 3.2 we summarize our approach
and techniques. In Section 3.3 we give detailed proofs of our results. Finally,
we conclude by summarizing the chapter and proposing some interesting open
problems in Section 3.4.
3.1 Preliminary
In this section, we give an overview on the Bayesian black-box reduction prob-
lem. We define the problem formally in Section 3.1.1 and review some related
work in the literature in Section 3.1.2.
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3.1.1 Problem Definition : Black-box Reduction
A central question at the interface between algorithms and economics is on the
existence of black-box reductions for mechanism design. Given black-box access
to any algorithm that maps inputs to outcomes, can a mechanism be constructed
that induces agents to truthfully report the inputs and produces an outcome
that is as good as the one produced by the algorithm? The mechanism must
be computationally tractable, specifically, making no more than a polynomial
number of elementary operations and black-box calls to the algorithm.
A line of research initiated by Hartline and Lucier (2010, 2015) demonstrated
that, for the welfare objective, Bayesian black-box reductions exist.1 In the
Bayesian setting, agents’ types are drawn from a distribution. The algorithm
is assumed to obtain good welfare for types from this distribution.2 The con-
structed mechanism is an approximation scheme; For any  it gives a mecha-
nism that is Bayesian incentive compatible (Definition 3.3.4) and obtains a wel-
fare that is an additive  form the algorithms welfare. Before formalizing this
problem, for further details on Bayesian mechanism design and our set of nota-
tions in this chapter, we refer the reader to Chapter 2, Section 2.1.
Definition 3.1.1 (BIC black-box reduction problem). Given black-box oracle ac-
cess to an allocation algorithm A, simulate a Bayesian incentive compatible al-
location algorithm A˜ that approximately preserves welfare, i.e. for every agent
a, vala(A˜) ≥ vala(A) − , and runs in time poly(n, 1

).
1One could also consider approximately preserving objectives other than welfare. However,
Chawla et al. (2012) have shown that BIC black-box reductions for the makespan objective can-
not be computationally efficient in general.
2Although this assumption is not necessary for the reduction to work, the black-box reduc-
tion in algorithmic mechanism design makes more sense when the algorithm is assumed to
obtain good welfare in a Bayesian sense.
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3.1.2 Related Work
In this literature, Hartline and Lucier (2010, 2015) solve the case of single-
dimensional agents and Hartline et al. (2011, 2015) solve the case of multi-
dimensional agents with discrete type spaces. For the relaxation of the prob-
lem where only approximate incentive compatibility is required, Bei and Huang
(2011) solve the case of multi-dimensional agents with discrete type space, and
Hartline et al. (2011, 2015) solve the general case by (1) achieving exact BIC
for discrete type spaces, and (2) achieving approximate BIC for general multi-
dimensional type spaces. These reductions are approximation schemes that are
polynomial in the number of agents, the desired approximation factor, and a
measure of the size of the agents’ type spaces (i.e., its dimension).
3.2 Our Approach in a Nutshell
We resolve a five-year-old open question from Hartline et al. (2011, 2015): There
is a polynomial time reduction from Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism design
to Bayesian algorithm design for welfare maximization problems. 3 The key distinc-
tion between our result and those of Hartline et al. (2011, 2015) is that both (a)
the agents’ preferences can be multi-dimensional and from a continuous space
(rather than single-dimensional or from a discrete space), and (b) the resulting
mechanism is exactly Bayesian incentive compatible (rather than approximately
Bayesian incentive compatible).
3A Bayesian algorithm is one that performs well in expectation when the input is drawn
from a known distribution. By polynomial time, we mean polynomial in the number of agents
and the combined “size” of their type spaces.
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A mechanism solicits preferences from agents, i.e., how much each agent
prefers each outcome, and then chooses an outcome. Incentive compatibility of a
mechanism requires that, though agents could misreport their preferences, it is
not in any agent’s best interest to do so. A quintessential research problem at
the intersection of mechanism deign and approximation algorithms is to iden-
tify black-box reductions from approximation mechanism design to approxima-
tion algorithm design. The key algorithmic property that makes a mechanism
incentive compatible is that, from any individual agent’s perspective, it must be
maximal-in-range, specifically, the outcome selected maximizes the agent’s util-
ity less some cost that is a function of the outcome (e.g., this cost function can
depend on other agents’ reported preferences.).
The black-box reductions from Bayesian mechanism design to Bayesian al-
gorithm design in the literature are based on obtaining an understanding of the
distribution of outcomes produced by the algorithm through simulating the al-
gorithm on samples from agents’ preferences. Notice that, even for structurally
simple problems, calculating the exact probability that a given outcome is se-
lected by an algorithm can be #P-hard. For example, Hartline et al. (2015) show
such a result for calculating the probability that a matching in a bipartite graph
is optimal, for a simple explicitly given distribution of edge weights. A black-
box reduction for mechanism design must therefore produce exactly maximal-
in-range outcomes merely from samples. This challenge motivates new ques-
tions for algorithm design from samples.
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3.2.1 The Expectations from Samples Model
In traditional algorithm design, the inputs are specified to the algorithm exactly.
In this chapter, we formulate the expectations from samples model. This model
calls for drawing an outcome from a distribution that is a precise function of
the expectations of some random sources that are given only by sample access.
Formally, a problem for this model is described by a function f : [0, 1]n → ∆(X)
where X is an abstract set of feasible outcomes and ∆(X) is the family of proba-
bility distributions over X. For any n input distributions on support [0, 1] with
unknown expectations µ = (µ1, . . . , µn), an algorithm for such a problem, with
only sample access to each of the n input distributions, must produce sample
outcome from X that is distributed exactly according to f (µ1, . . . , µn).
Producing an outcome that is approximately drawn according to the desired
distribution can typically be done from estimates of the expectations formed
from sample averages (a.k.a., Monte Carlo sampling). On the other hand, exact
implementation of many natural functions f is either impossible for informa-
tion theoretic reasons or requires sophisticated techniques. Impossibility gener-
ally follows, for example, when f is discontinuous. The literature on Bernoulli
Factories (e.g., Keane and O’Brien, 1994), which inspires our generalization to
the expectations from samples model and provides some of the basic building
blocks for our results, considers the special case where the input distribution
and output distribution are both Bernoullis (i.e., supported on {0, 1}).
We propose and solve two fundamental problems for the expectations from
samples model. The first problem considers the biases p = (p1, . . . , pm) of m
Bernoulli random variables as the marginal probabilities of a distribution on
{1, . . . ,m} (i.e., p satisfies ∑i pi = 1) and asks to sample from this distribution. We
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develop an algorithm that we call the Bernoulli Race to solve this problem.
The second problem corresponds to the “soft maximum” problem given by
a regularizer that is a multiple 1/λ of the Shannon entropy function H(p) =
−∑i pi log pi. The marginal probabilities on outcomes that maximize the ex-
pected value of the distribution over outcomes less the cost of the negative en-
tropy regularizer are given by exponential weights,4 i.e., the function outputs
i with probability proportional to eλpi . A straightforward exponentiation and
then reduction to the Bernoulli Race above does not have polynomial sample
complexity. We develop an algorithm that we call the Fast Exponential Bernoulli
Race to solve this problem.
3.2.2 Building on Top of Previous Black-box Reductions
A special case of the problem that we must solve to apply the standard approach
to black-box reductions is the single-agent multiple-urns problem. In this setting, a
single agent faces a set X of urns, and each urn contains a random object whose
distribution is unknown, but can be sampled. The agent’s type determines his
utility for each object; fixing this type, urn i is associated with a random real-
valued reward with unknown expectation µi. Our goal is to allocate the agent
his favorite urn, or close to it.
As described above, incentive compatibility requires an algorithm for select-
ing a high-value urn that is maximal-in-range. If we could exactly calculate
the expected values µ1, . . . , µn from the agent’s type, this problem is trivial both
algorithmically and from a mechanism design perspective: simply solicit the
4This is a standard relationship that has, for example, been employed in previous work in
mechanism design (e.g., Huang and Kannan, 2012).
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agent’s type t then allocate him the urn with the maximum µi = µi(t). As de-
scribed above, with only sample access to the expected values of each urn, we
cannot implement the exact maximum. Our solution is to apply the Fast Expo-
nential Bernoulli Race as a solution to the regularized maximization problem in
the expectations from samples model. This algorithm – with only sample access
to the agent’s values for each urn – will assign the agent to a random urn with
a high expected value and is maximal-in-range.
The multi-agent reduction from Bayesian mechanism design to Bayesian al-
gorithm design of Hartline et al. (2011, 2015) is based on solving a matching
problem between multiple agents and outcomes, where an agent’s value for an
outcome is the expectation of a random variable which can be accessed only
through sampling.5 Specifically, this problem generalizes the above-described
single-agent multiple-urns problem to the problem of matching agents to urns
with the goal of approximately maximizing the total weight of the matching
(the social welfare). Again, for incentive compatibility we require this expec-
tations from samples algorithm to be maximal-in-range from each agent’s per-
spective. Using methods from Agrawal and Devanur’s (2015) work on stochas-
tic online convex optimization, we reduce this matching problem to the single-
agent multiple-urns problem.
As stated in the opening paragraph, our main result – obtained through the
approach outlined above – is a polynomial time reduction from Bayesian incen-
tive compatible mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design. The analysis
assumes that agents’ values are normalized to the [0, 1] interval and gives ad-
ditive loss in the welfare. The reduction is an approximation scheme and the
5Bei and Huang (2011) independently discovered a similar reduction based on solving a
fractional assignment problem. Their reduction applies to finite, discrete type spaces and is
approximately Bayesian incentive compatible.
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dependence of the runtime on the additive loss is inverse polynomial. The re-
duction depends polynomially on a suitable notion of the size of the space of
agent preferences. For example, applied to environments where agents have
preferences that lie in high-dimensional spaces, the runtime of the reduction de-
pends polynomially on the number of points necessary to approximately cover
each agent’s space of preferences. More generally, the bounds we obtain are
polynomial in the bounds of Hartline et al. (2011, 2015) but the resulting mech-
anism, unlike in the proceeding work, is exactly Bayesian incentive compatible.
3.2.3 Organization of the Technical Parts
The organization of the Section 3.3, which includes all the technical details, sep-
arates the development of the expectations from samples model and its appli-
cation to black-box reductions in Bayesian mechanism design. Section 3.3.1 de-
fines two central problems in the expectations from samples model, sampling
from outcomes with linear weights and sampling from outcomes with expo-
nential weights, and gives algorithms for solving them. We return to mecha-
nism design problems in Section 3.3.2 and solve the single-agent multiple urns
problem. In Section 3.3.3 we give our main result, the reduction from Bayesian
mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design. Throughout the next section,
we heavily use the Bernoulli factory toolbox that we introduced earlier in Chap-
ter 2, Section 2.2.
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3.3 Detailed Result: a BIC Black-box Reduction
In this section, we provide all the details needed to explain and prove our BIC
black-box reduction, by exploiting different technical pieces and gluing them
together at the end.
3.3.1 The Expectations from Samples Model
The expectations from samples model is a combinatorial generalization of the
Bernoulli factory problem. The goal is to select an outcome from a distribution
that is a function of the expectations of a set of input distributions. These input
distributions can be accessed only by sampling.
Definition 3.3.1. Given function f : (0, 1)n → ∆(X) for domain X, the expectations
from samples problem is to output a sample from f (µ) given black-box access to
independent samples from n distributions supported on [0, 1] with expectations
µ = (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈ (0, 1)n.
Without loss of generality, by the Continuous to Bernoulli construction of
Section 2.2, the input random variables can be assumed to be Bernoullis and,
thus, this expectations of samples model can be viewed as a generalization of the
Bernoulli factory question to output spaces X beyond {0, 1}. In this section we
propose and solve two fundamental problems for the expectations of samples
model. In these problems the outcomes are the a finite set of m outcomes X =
{1, . . . ,m} and the input distributions are m Bernoulli distributions with biases
p = (p1, . . . , pm).
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In the first problem, biases correspond to the marginal probabilities with
which each of the outcomes should be selected. The goal is to produce ran-
dom i from X so that the probability of i is exactly its marginal probability pi.
More generally, if the biases do not sum to one, this problem is equivalently the
problem of random selection with linear weights.
The second problem we solve corresponds to a regularized maximization
problem, or specifically random selection from exponential weights. For this prob-
lem the baiases of the m Bernoulli input distributions correspond to the weights
of the outcomes. The goal is to produce a random i from X according to the dis-
tribution given by exponential weights, i.e., the probability of selecting i from X
is eλpi/
∑
j eλp j .
Random Selection with Linear Weights
Definition 3.3.2 (Random Selection with Linear Weights). The random selection
with linear weights problem is to sample from the probability distribution f (v)
defined by PrI∼ f (v)[I = i] = vi/
∑
j v j for each i in {1, . . . ,m}with only sample access
to distributions with expectations v = (v1, . . . , vm).
We solve the random selection with linear weights problem by an algorithm
that we call the Bernoulli race (Algorithm 1). The algorithm repeatedly picks a
coin uniformly at random and flips it. The winning coin is the first one to come
up heads in this process.
Theorem 3.3.1. The Bernoulli Race (Algorithm 1) samples with linear weights (Def-
inition 3.3.2) with an expected m/
∑
i vi samples from input distributions with biases
v1, . . . , vn.
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Algorithm 1: Bernoulli Race
1: input sample access to m coins with biases v1, . . . , vm.
2: loop
3: Draw I uniformly from {1, . . . ,m} and draw P from input distribution I.
4: If P is heads then output I and halt.
5: end loop
Proof. At each iteration, the algorithm terminates if the flipped coin outputs 1
and iterates otherwise. Since the coin is chosen uniformly at random, the prob-
ability of termination at each iteration is 1m
∑
i vi. The total number of iterations












































Random Selection with Exponential Weights
Definition 3.3.3 (Random Selection with Exponential Weights). For parameter
λ > 0, the random selection with exponential weights problem is to sample from the
probability distribution f (v) defined by PrI∼ f (v)[I = i] = exp(λvi)/
∑
j exp(λv j) for
each i in {1, . . . ,m} with only sample access to distributions with expectations
v = (v1, . . . , vm).
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The Basic Exponential Bernoulli Race, below, samples from the exponential
weights distribution. The algorithm follows the paradigm of picking one of the
input distributions, exponentiating it, sampling from the exponentiated distri-
bution, and repeating until one comes up heads. While this algorithm does not
generally run in polynomial time, it is a building block for one that does.
Algorithm 2: The Basic Exponential Bernoulli Race (with parameter λ > 0)
1: input Sample access to m coins with biases v1, . . . , vm.
2: For each i, apply Bernoulli Exponentiation to coin i to produce coin with bias v˜i =
exp(λ(vi − 1)).
3: Run the Bernoulli Race on the coins with biases v˜ = (v˜1, . . . , v˜m).
Theorem 3.3.2. The Basic Exponential Bernoulli Race (Algorithm 2) samples with
exponential weights (Definition 3.3.3) with an expected λmeλ(1−vmax) samples from input
distributions with biases v1, . . . , vn and vmax = maxi vi.
Proof. The correctness and runtime follows from the correctness and runtimes
of Bernoulli Exponentiation and the Bernoulli Race.

The Fast Exponential Bernoulli Race
Sampling from exponential weights is typically used as a “soft maximum”
where the parameter λ controls how close the selected outcome is to the true
maximum. For such an application, exponential dependence on λ in the runtime
would be prohibitive. Unfortunately, when vmax is bounded away from one, the
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runtime of the Basic Logistic Bernoulli Race (Algorithm 2; Theorem 3.3.2) is ex-
ponential in λ. A simple observation allows allows the resolution of this issue:
the exponential weights distribution is invariant to any uniform additive shift
of all weights. This section applies this idea to develop the Fast Logistic Bernoulli
Race.
Observe that for any given parameter , we can easily implement a Bernoulli
random variable Z whose bias z is within an additive  of vmax. Note that, un-
like the other algorithms in this section, a precise relationship between z and
v1, . . . , vm is not required.
Lemma 3.3.3. For parameter  ∈ (0, 1], there is an algorithm for sampling from a





)) samples from input distributions with biases v1, . . . , vm.




) times from each of the m
coins, let vˆi be the empirical estimate of coin i’s bias obtained by averaging, then
apply the Continuous to Bernoulli algorithm (Section 2.2) to map vˆmax = maxi vˆi
to a Bernoulli random variable.
Standard tail bounds imply that |vˆmax − vmax| < /2 with probability at least
1 − /2, and therefore z = E[vˆmax] ∈ [vmax − , vmax + ]. 
Since we are interested in a fast logistic Bernoulli race as λ grows large, we re-
strict attention to λ > 4. We set  = 1/λ in the estimation of vmax (by Lemma 3.3.3).
This estimate will be used to boost the bias of each distribution in the input so
that the maximum bias is at least 1 − 3. The boosting of the bias is imple-
mented with Bernoulli Addition which, to be fast, requires the cumulative bias
be bounded away from one. Thus, the probabilities are scaled down by a factor
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of 1 − 2, this scaling is subsequently counterbalanced by adjusting the param-
eter λ. The formal details are given below.
Algorithm 3: Fast Exponential Bernoulli Race (with parameter λ > 4)
1: input Sample access to m coins with biases v1, . . . , vm.
2: Let  = 1/λ.
3: Construct a coin with bias z ∈ [vmax − , vmax + ] (from Lemma 3.3.3).
4: Apply Bernoulli Down Scaling to a coin with bias 1 − z to implement a coin with
bias (1 − 2)(1 − z).
5: For all i, apply Bernoulli Down Scaling to implement a coin with bias (1 − 2)vi.
6: For all i, apply Bernoulli Addition to implement coin with bias v′i = (1 − 2)vi + (1 −
2)(1 − z).
7: Run the Basic Exponential Bernoulli Race with parameter λ′ = λ1−2 on the coins
with bias v′1, . . . , v
′
m.
Theorem 3.3.4. The Fast Exponential Bernoulli Race (Algorithm 3) samples with ex-
ponential weights (Definition 3.3.3) with an expected O(λ4m2 log(λm)) samples from
the input distributions.
Proof. The correctness and runtime follows from the correctness and runtimes
of the Basic Exponential Bernoulli Race, Bernoulli Doubling, Lemma 3.3.3 (for
estimate of vmax), and the fact λ′v′i = λ(vi + 1 − z) and the distribution given by
exponential weights is invariant to additive shifts of all weights.
A detailed analysis of the runtime follows. Since the algorithm builds a num-
ber of sampling subroutines in a hierarchy, we analyze the runtime of the algo-
rithm and the various subroutines in a bottom up fashion. Steps 3 and 4 imple-
ment a coin with bias (1 − 2)(1 − z) with runtime O(λ2m · log(λm)) per sample,
as per the bound of Lemma 3.3.3. The coin implemented in Step 5 is sampled
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in constant time. Observe that v′i ≤ (1 − 2)(1 + vi − vmax + ) ≤ 1 − , and the
runtime of Bernoulli Doubling implies that O(λ) samples from the coins of Steps
4 and 5 suffice for sampling Bern[v′i]; we conclude that a v
′
i-coin can be sampled
in time O(λ3m · log(λm)). Finally, note that for v′max = maxi v′i , we have v′max ≥ 1−3;
Theorem 3.3.2 then implies that the Basic Exponential Bernoulli Race samples at
most λ′meλ′ 3 ≤ 2e6λm = O(λm) times from the v′-coins; we conclude the claimed
runtime. 
3.3.2 The Single-Agent Multiple-Urns Problem
We investigate incentive compatible mechanism design for the single-agent
multiple-urns problem. Informally, mechanism is needed to assign an agent to
one of many urns. Each urn contains objects and the agent’s value for being as-
signed to an urn is taken in expectation over objects from the urn. The problem
asks for an incentive compatible mechanism with good welfare (i.e., the value
of the agent for the assigned urn).
Problem Definition and Notations
A single agent with type t from type space T desires an object o from outcome
space O. The agent’s value for an outcome o is a function of her type t and de-




] − p for randomized outcome o and expected payment p.
There are m urns. Each urn j is given by a distribution D j over outcomes in O.
If the agent is assigned to urn j she obtains an object from the urn’s distribution
D j.
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A mechanism can solicit the type of the agent (who may misreport if she de-
sires). We further assume (1) the mechanism has black-box access to evaluate
v(t, o) for any type t and outcome o, (2) the mechanism has sample access to the
distribution D j of each urn j. The mechanism may draw objects from urns and
evaluate the agent’s reported value for these objects, but then must ultimately
assign the agent to a single urn and charge the agent a payment. The urn and
payment that the agent is assigned are random variables in the mechanism’s in-
ternal randomization and randomness from the mechanisms potential samples
from the urns’ distributions.
The distribution of the urn the mechanism assigns to an agent, as a function
of her type t, is denoted by x(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xm(t)) where x j(t) is the marginal
probability that the agent is assigned to urn j. Denote the expected value of the




. The expected welfare of the mechanism is∑
j v j(t) x j(t). The expected payment of this agent is denoted by p(t). The agent’s
utility for the outcome and payment of the mechanism is given by
∑
j v j(t) x j(t)−
p(t). Incentive compatibility is defined by the agent with type t preferring her
outcome and payment to that assigned to another type t′.
Definition 3.3.4. A single-agent mechanism (x, p) is incentive compatible if, for all
t, t′ ∈ T :
∑
j
v j(t) x j(t) − p(t) ≥
∑
j
v j(t) x j(t′) − p(t′) (3.1)
A multi-agent mechanism is Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) if equa-
tion (3.1) holds for the outcome of the mechanism in expectation of the truthful
reports of the other agents.
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Incentive Compatible Approximate Scheme
If the agent’s expected value for each urn is known, or equivalently mechanism
designer knows the distributions D j for all urns j rather than only sample ac-
cess, this problem would be easy and admits a trivial optimal mechanism: sim-
ply select the urn maximizing the agent’s expected value v j(t) according to her
reported type t, and charge her a payment of zero. What makes this problem
interesting is that the designer is restricted to only sample the agent’s value for
an urn. In this case, the following Monte-carlo adaptation of the trivial mech-
anism is tempting: sample from each urn sufficiently many times to obtain a
close estimate v˜ j(t) of v j(t) with high probability (up to any desired precision
δ > 0), then choose the urn j maximizing v˜ j(t) and charge a payment of zero.
This mechanism is not incentive compatible, as illustrated by a simple example.
Example Consider two urns. Urn A contains only outcome o2, whereas B two
contains a mixture of outcomes o1 and o3, with o1 slightly more likely than o3.
Now consider an agent who has (true) values 0, 1, and 2 for outcomes o1, o2,
and o3 respectively. If this agent reports her true type, the trivial Monte-carlo
mechanism — instantiated with any desired finite degree of precision — assigns
her urn A most of the time, but assigns her urn B with some nonzero probabil-
ity. The agent gains by misreporting her value of outcome o3 as 0, since this
guarantees her preferred urn A.
The above example might seem counter-intuitive, since the trivial Monte-
carlo mechanism appears to be doing its best to maximize the agent’s utility,
up to the limits of (unavoidable) sampling error. One intuitive rationalization
is the following: an agent can slightly gain by procuring (by whatever means)
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more precise information about the distributions D j than that available to the
mechanism, and using this information to guide her strategic misreporting of
her type. This raises the following question:
Question: Is there an incentive-compatible mechanism for the single-agent multiple-
urns problem which achieves welfare within  of the optimal, and samples only
poly(m, 1

) times (in expectation) from the urns?
We resolve the above question in the affirmative. We present approximation
scheme for this problem that is based on our solution to the problem of random
selection with exponential weights (Section 3.3.1). The solution to the single-
agent multiple-urns problem is a main ingredient in the Bayesian mechanism
that we propose in Section 3.3.3 as our black-box reduction mechanism.
To explain the approximate scheme, we start by recalling the following stan-
dard theorem in mechanism design.
Theorem 3.3.5. For outcome rule x, there exists payment rule p so that single-agent
mechanism (x, p) is incentive compatible if and only if x is maximal in range, i.e., x(t) ∈
argmaxx′
∑
j v j(t) x′j − c(x′), for some cost function c(·).6
The payments that satisfy Theorem 3.3.5 can be easily calculated with black-
box access to outcome rule x(·). For a single-agent problem, this payment can
be calculated in two calls to the function x(·), one on the agent’s reported type t
and the other on a type randomly drawn from the path between the origin and t.
Further discussion and details are given in Appendix A.1. It suffices, therefore,
to identify a mechanism that samples from urns and assigns the agent to an urn
6The “only if” direction of this theorem requires that the type space T be rich enough so that
the induced space of values across the urns is {(v1(t), . . . , vm(t)) : t ∈ T } = [0, 1]m.
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that induces an outcome rule x(·) that is good for welfare, i.e., ∑i v j(t) x j(t), and
is maximal in range. The following theorem solves the problem.
Theorem 3.3.6. There is an incentive-compatible mechanism for the single-agent
multiple-urns problem which achieves an additive -approximation to the optimal wel-
fare in expectation, and runs in time O(m2( logm

)5) in expectation.
Proof. Consider the problem of selecting a distribution over urns to opti-
mize welfare plus (a scaling of) the Shannon entropy function, i.e., x(t) =




j x′j log x
′
j.
7 It is well known that the optimizer x(t) is
given by exponential weights, i.e., the marginal probability of assigning the jth
urn is given by x j(t) = exp(λv j(t))/
∑
j′ exp(λv j′(t)). In Section 3.3.1 we gave a poly-
nomal time algorithm for sampling from exponential weights, specifically, the
Fast Exponential Bernoulli Race (Algorithm 3). Proper choice of the parameter
λ controls trades off faster runimes with decreased loss due to entropy term.
The entropy is maximized at the uniform distribution x′ = (1/m, . . . , 1/m) with
entropy logm. Thus, choosing λ = logm/ guarantees that the welfare is within
an additive  of the optimal welfare max j v j(t). The bound of the theorem then
follows from the analysis of the Fast Exponential Bernoulli Race (Theorem 3.3.4)
with this choice of λ. 
7The additive entropy term can be interpreted as a negative cost vis-à-vis Theorem 3.3.5.
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3.3.3 A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Black-box Reduction
Surrogate Selection and the Replica-Surrogate Matching
A main conclusion of the literature on Bayesian reductions for mechanism de-
sign is that the multi-agent problem of reducing Bayesian mechanism design
to algorithm design, itself, reduces to a single-agent problem of surrogate selec-
tion. Consider any agent in the original problem and the induced algorithm with
the inputs form other agents hardcoded as random draws from their respective
type distributions. The induced algorithm maps the type of this agent to a dis-
tribution over outcomes. If this distribution over outcomes is maximal-in-range
then there exists payments for which the induced algorithm is incentive com-
patible (Theorem 3.3.5). If not, the problem of surrogate selection is to map the
type of the agent to an input to the algorithm to satisfy three properties:
(a) The composition of surrogate selection and the induced algorithm is
maximal-in-range,
(b) The composition approximately preserves welfare,
(c) The surrogate selection preserves the type distribution.
Condition (c), a.k.a. stationarity, implies that fixing the non-maximaility-of-
range of the algorithm for a particular agent does not affect the outcome for
any other agents. With such an approach each agent’s incentive problem can be
resolved independently from that of other agents.
Theorem 3.3.7 (Hartline et al., 2015). The composition of an algorithm with a profile
of surrogate selection rules, that maps the profile of agent types to an input to the al-
gorithm, is Bayesian incentive compatible and approximately preserves the algorithms
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welfare (the loss in welfare is the sum of the losses in welfare of each surrogate selection
rule).
The surrogate selection rule of Hartline et al. (2015) is based on setting up a
matching problem between random types from the distribution (replicas) and
the outcomes of the algorithm on random types from the distribution (surro-
gates). The true type of the agent is one of the replicas, and the surrogate se-
lection rule outputs the surrogate to which this replica is matched. This ap-
proach addresses the three properties of surrogate selection rules as (a) if the
matching selected is maximal-in-range then the composition of the surrogate
selection rule with the induced algorithm is maximal-in-range, (b) the welfare
of the matching is the welfare of the reduction and the optimal matching ap-
proximates the welfare of the original algorithm, and (c) any maximal matching
gives a stationary surrogate selection rule. For a detailed discussion on why
maximal-in-range matching will result in a BIC mechanism after composing the
corresponding surrogate selection rule with the allocation algorithm, we refer
the interested reader to look at Lemma A.2.1 and Lemma A.2.2 in Appendix A.2.
Definition 3.3.5. The replica-surrogate matching surrogate selection rule; for a k-
to-1 matching algorithm M, a integer market size m, and load k; maps a type t to
a surrogate type as follows:
1. Pick the real-agent index i∗ uniformly at random from {1, . . . , km}.
2. Define the replica type profile r, an km-tuple of types by setting ri∗ = t and
sampling the remaining km − 1 replica types r−i∗ i.i.d. from the type distri-
bution F .
3. Sample the surrogate type profile s, an m-tuple of i.i.d. samples from the type
distribution F .
42
4. Run matching algorithm M on the complete bipartite graph between repli-
cas and surrogates.
5. Output the surrogate j∗ that is matched to i∗.
The value that a replica obtains for the outcome that the induced algorithm
produces for a surrogate, henceforth, surrogate outcome, is a random variable.
The analysis of Hartline et al. (2015) is based on the study of an ideal com-





is known exactly. In this computationally-unrealistic model and
with these values as weights, the maximum weight matching algorithm can be
employed in the replica-surrogate matching surrogate selection rule above, and
it results in a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism. Hartline et al. (2015)
analyze the welfare of the resulting mechanism in the case where the load is
k = 1, prove that conditions (a)-(c) are satisfied, and give (polynomial) bounds
on the size m that is necessary for the expected welfare of the mechanism to be
an additive  from that of the algorithm.
Remark Given a BIC allocation algorithm A˜ through a replica-surrogate match-
ing surrogate selection, the payments that satisfy Bayesian incentive compati-
bility can be easily calculated with black-box access to A˜ as implicit payments
(Appendix A.1).
If M is maximum matching, conditions (a)-(c) clearly continue to hold for our
generalization to load k > 1. Moreover, the welfare of the reduction is monotone
non-decreasing in k.
Lemma 3.3.8. In the ideal computational model (where the value of a replica for being
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matched to a surrogate is given exactly) the per-replica welfare of the replica-surrogate
maximum matching is monotone non-decreasing in load k.
Proof. Consider a non-optimal matching that groups replicas into k groups of
size m and finds the optimal 1-to-1 matching between replicas in each group and
the surrogates. As these are random (k = 1)−matchings, the expected welfare
of each such matching is equal to the expected welfare of the (k = 1)−matching.
These matchings combine to give a feasible matching between the mk replicas
and m surrogates. Thus, the total expected welfare of the optimal k-to-1 match-
ing between replicas and surrogates is at least k times the expected welfare of
the (k = 1)−matching. Thus, the per-replica welfare, i.e., normalized by mk, is
monotone in k. 
Our main result is an approximation scheme for the ideal reduction of Hart-
line et al. (2015). We identify a k > 1 and a polynomial (in m and 1/) time
k-to-1 matching algorithm for the black-box model and prove that the expected
welfare of this matching algorithm (per-replica) is within an additive  of the
expected welfare per-replica of the optimal matching in the ideal model with
load k = 1 (as analyzed by Hartline et al., 2015). The welfare of the ideal model
is monotone non-decreasing in load k; therefore it will be sufficient to identify a
polynomial load k where there is a polynomial time algorithm in the black-box
model that has  loss relative to the ideal model for that same load k.
In the remainder of this section we replace this ideal matching algorithm
with an approximation scheme for the black-box model where replica values
for surrogate outcomes can only be estimated by sampling. For any  our algo-
rithm gives an  additive loss of the welfare of the ideal algorithm with only a
44
polynomial increase to the runtime. Moreover, the algorithm produces a perfect
(and so maximal) matching, and therefore the surrogate selection rule is sta-
tionary; and the algorithm is maximal-in-range for the true agent’s replica, and
therefore the resulting mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible.
Entropy Regularized Matching
In this section we define an entropy regularized bipartite matching problem and
discuss it’s solution. We will refer to the left-hand-side vertices as replicas and
the right-hand-side vertices as surrogates. The weights on the edge between
replica i ∈ {1, . . . , km} and surrogate j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} will be denoted by vi, j. In our
application to the replica-surrogate matching defined in the previous section,




for (i, j) ∈ [km] × [m].
Definition 3.3.6. For weights v = [vi, j](i, j)∈[km]×[m], the entropy regularized match-





xi, j vi, j − δ
∑
i, j




xi, j ≤ k ∀ j ∈ [m],∑
j
xi, j ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ [km].
The optimal value of this program is denoted OPT(v).
The dual variables for right-hand-side constraints of the matching polytope
can be interpreted as prices for the surrogate outcomes. Given prices, the utility
of a replica for a surrogate outcome given prices is the difference between the
replica’s value and the price. The following lemma shows that for the right
choice of dual variables, the maximizer of the entropy regularized matching
program is given by exponential weights with weights equal to the utilities.
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Observation 1. For the optimal Lagrangian dual variables α∗ ∈ Rm for surrogate fea-






xi, j ≤ 1 , ∀i
}
where L(x,α) , ∑i, j xi, j vi, j − δ∑i, j xi, j log xi, j + ∑ j α j(k − ∑i xi, j) is the Lagrangian












) , ∀i, j.
Observation 1 recasts the entropy regularized matching as, for each replica,
sampling from the distribution of exponential weights. For any replica i and
fixed dual variables α our Fast Exponential Bernoulli Race (Algorithm 3) gives
a polynomial time algorithm for sampling from the distribution of exponential
weights in the expectations from samples computational model.
Lemma 3.3.9. For replica i and any prices (dual variables) α ∈ [0, h]m, allocating a
surrogate j drawn from the exponential weights distribution
xi, j =
exp





( vi, j′−α j′
δ
) , ∀ j ∈ [m], (3.2)
is maximal-in-range, as defined in Definition 3.3.5, and this random surrogate j can





samples from replica-surrogate-outcome value distri-
butions.
Proof. To see that the distribution is maximal-in-range when assigning surrogate














for replica i. Similar to Observation 1, it is easy to see that the exponential weight
distribution in (3.2) is the unique maximizer of this concave program by looking
at the first-order conditions.
To apply the Fast Exponential Bernoulli Race to the utilities, of the form
vi, j − α j ∈ [−h, 1], we must first normalize them to be on the interval [0, 1].
This normalization is accomplished by adding h to the utilities (which has no
effect on the exponential weights distribution, and therefore preserves being
maximal-in-range), and then scaling by 1/(h + 1). The scaling needs to be cor-
rected by setting λ in the Fast Exponential Bernoulli Race (Algorithm 3) to
(h + 1)/δ. The expected number of samples from the value distributions that
are required by the algorithm, per Theorem 3.3.4, is O(h4m2 log(hm/δ)δ−4). 
If we knew the optimal Lagrangian variablesα∗ from Observation 1, it would
be sufficient to define the surrogate selection rule by simply sampling from the
true agent i∗’s exponential weights distribution (which is polynomial time per
Lemma 3.3.9). Notice that the wrong values of α correspond to violating pri-
mal constraints (for the surrogates) and thus the outcome from sampling from
exponential weights for such α would not correspond to a maximal-in-range
matching. In the next section we give a polynomial time approximation scheme
that is maximal-in-range for each replica, and therefore true agent i∗, and ap-
proximates sampling from the correct α∗.
Online Entropy Regularized Matching
In this section, we reduce the entropy regularized matching problem to the
problem of sampling from exponential weights (as described in Lemma 3.3.9)
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in an online fashion. Consider replicas being drawn adversarially, but in a ran-
dom order, over times 1, . . . , km. The basic observation is that approximate dual
variables α are sufficient for an online assignment of each replica to a surrogate
via Lemma 3.3.9 to approximate the optimal (offline) regularized matching. Re-
call, the replicas are independently and identically distributed in the original
problem.
Our construction borrows techniques used in designing online algorithms
for stochastic online convex programming problems (Agrawal and Devanur,
2015; Chen and Wang, 2013), and stochastic online packing problems (Agrawal
et al., 2009; Devanur et al., 2011; Badanidiyuru et al., 2013b; Kesselheim et al.,
2014). Our online algorithm (Algorithm 4, below) considers the replicas in order,
updates the dual variables using multiplicative weight updates based on the
current allocation, and allocates to each agent by sampling from the exponential
weights distribution as given by Lemma 3.3.9. The algorithm is parameterized
by δ, the scale of the regularizer; by η, the rate at which the algorithm learns the
dual variables α; and by scale parameter γ, which we set later.
The algorithm needs to satisfy four properties to be useful in a polyno-
mial time reduction. First, it needs to produce a maximal matching so that the
replica-surrogate matching surrogate selection rule is stationary, specifically via
condition (c). It needs to be maximal-in-range for the real agent (replica i∗).
In fact, all replicas are treated symmetrically and allocated by sampling from
an exponential weights distribution that is maximal-in-range via Lemma 3.3.9.
Third, it needs to have good welfare compared to the ideal matching. Fourth,
it’s runtime needs to be polynomial. The first two properties are immediate and
imply the theorem below. The last two properties are analyzed below.
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Algorithm 4: Online Entropy Regularized Matching Algorithm (with parameters
δ, η, γ ∈ R+)
1: input: sample access to replica-surrogate matching instance values {vi, j} for replicas
i ∈ {1, . . . ,mk} and surrogates j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
2: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , km} do
3: Let k j be the number of replicas previously matched to each surrogate j and
J = { j : k j < k} the set of surrogates with availability remaining.
4: Set α(i) according to the exonential weights distribution with weights η · k j for
available surrogates j ∈ J (α(i)j = 0 for unavailable surrogates).
5: Match replica i to surrogate j ∈ J drawn according to the exponential weights
distribution with weights (vi, j − γ α(i)j )/δ with the Fast Exponential Bernoulli Race
(Algorithm 3).
6: end for
Theorem 3.3.10. The mechanism that maps types to surrogates via the replica-
surrogate matching surrogate selection rule with the online entropy regularized match-
ing algorithm (with payments from Theorem 3.3.5) is Bayesian incentive compatible.
Social Welfare Loss
We analyze the welfare loss of the online entropy regularized matching algo-
rithm (Algorithm 4) with regularizer parameter δ, learning rate η, and scale pa-
rameter γ set as a k-fraction of an estimate of the value of the offline program
(Definition 3.3.6).
Theorem 3.3.11. There are parameter settings for online entropy regularized match-
ing algorithm (Algorithm 4) for which (1) its per-replica expected welfare is within an
additive  of the optimal welfare of the replica surrogate matching, and (2) given oracle
access toA, the running time of this algorithm is polynomial in m and 1/.
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To prove this theorem, we first argue how to set γ to be a constant approxi-
mation to the k-fraction of optimal value of the convex program with high prob-
ability, and with efficient sampling. Second, we argue that the online and offline
optimal entropy regularized matching algorithms have nearly the same wel-
fare. Finally, we argue that the offline optimal entropy regularized matching
has nearly the welfare of the offline optimal matching. The proof of the theorem
is then given by combining these results with the right parameters.
Parameter γ and approximating the offline optimal. Pre-setting γ to be an
estimate of the optimal objective of the convex program in Definition 3.3.6 is
necessary for the competitive ratio guarantee of Algorithm 4. Also, γ should
be set in a symmetric and incentive compatible way across replicas, to preserve
stationarity property. To this end, we look at an instance generated by an inde-
pendent random draw of mk replicas (while fixing the surrogates). In such an
instance, we estimate the expected values by sampling and taking the empiri-
cal mean for each edge in the replica-surrogate bipartite graph. We then solve
the convex program exactly (which can be done in polytime using an efficient
separation oracle). Obviously, this scheme is incentive compatible as we do not
even use the reported type of true agent in our calculation for γ, and it is sym-
metric across replicas. In Appendix A.3 we show how this approach leads to a
constant approximation to the optimal value of the offline program in 3.3.6 with
high probability.
Lemma 3.3.12. If k = Ω( log(η
−1)
δ2m(logm)2 ), then there exist a polytime approximation scheme
to calculate γ (i.e. it only needs polynomial in m, k, δ−1 and η−1 samples to black-box
allocationA) such that
OPT(v)/k ≤ γ ≤ O(1) OPT(v)/k
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with probability at least 1 − η.
Competitive ratio of the online entropy regularized matching algorithm.
Assuming γ is set to be a constant approximation to the k-fraction of the op-
timal value of the offline entropy regularized matching program, we prove the
following lemma.
Lemma 3.3.13. For a fixed regularizer parameter δ > 0, learning rate η > 0, regular-
ized welfare estimate γ, and market size m ∈ N that satisfy
m logm
η2
≤ k and OPT(v)/k ≤ γ ≤ O(1) OPT(v)/k ,
the online entropy regularized matching algorithm (Algorithm 4) obtains at least an
(1 − O(η)) fraction of the welfare of the optimal entropy regularized matching (Defini-
tion 3.3.6).
Proof. Recall that OPT(v) denotes the optimal objective value of the entropy reg-
ularized matching program. We will analyze the algorithm up to the iteration
τ that the first surrogate becomes unavailable (because all k copies are matched
to previous replicas).
Define the contribution of replica i to the Lagrangian objective of Observa-




vi, j xi, j − δ
∑
j
xi, j log xi, j +
∑
j
γα j( 1m − xi, j). (3.3)
The difference between the outcome for replica i in the online algorithm and
the solution to the offline optimization is that the algorithm selects the outcome
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with respect to dual variables γα(i) while the offline algorithm selects the out-
come with respect to the optimal dual variables α∗ (Observation 1). Denote the
outcome of the online algorithm by
xi = (xi,1, . . . , xi,m) = argmaxx′i∈∆m L(i)(x′i , γα(i)) ,




vi, j xi, j − δ
∑
j
xi, j log xi, j .
Likewise for the outcome of the offline optimization by x∗i and OPTi. Denote by
xˆi the indicator vector for the online algorithm sampling from xi.















m − x∗i, j
)
so, by rearranging the terms and taking expectations conditioned on the ob-
served history, we have
E
[
ALGi | Hi−1] ≥ γE[α(i) · xi | Hi−1] + E[OPTi | Hi−1] − γE[α(i) · x∗i | Hi−1]




+ γα(i) · xˆi − (E[OPTi] − E[OPTi | Hi−1])








) + γα(i) · (E[xi | Hi−1] − xˆi)
≥ 1
mk



























ALGi|Hi−1] ≥ τ − 1mk OPT(v) + γ
τ−1∑
i=1
α(i) · (xˆi − 1m1) −
τ−1∑
i=1
(Li + L′i) (3.4)
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In order to bound the term γ
∑τ−1
i=1 α
(i) · (xˆi − 1m1), let gi(α) , α · (xˆi − 1m1). Then, by
applying the regret bound of exponential gradient (or essentially multiplicative
weight update) online learning algorithm for any realization of random vari-
ables {xˆi} (which will result in α(i) to be the exponential weights distributions
with weights η · k j), we have
τ−1∑
i=1










where the last inequality holds because at the time τ−1, either there exists j such
that
∑τ−1
i=1 xˆi, j = k, or τ− 1 = mk and all surrogate outcome budgets are exhausted.








gi(e j) ≥ k − τ − 1m ,





gi(α) ≥ 0 ≥ k − τ − 1m .











≥ τ − 1
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where the last inequality holds simply because k > logm
η2
. By taking expectations
from both sides, we have









We now bound each term separately. First, define Yi ,
∑
i′≤i Li, and then note
that E
[
Yi − Yi−1|Hi−1] = 0, and therefore sequence {Yi} forms a martingale. Now,





≤ γO(√km log km).
Proof of Lemma 3.3.14. Sequence {Yi}mki=1 forms a martingale, following the fact
that E
[
Yi − Yi−1|Hi−1] = 0 and using Cauchy-Schwarz
|Yi − Yi−1| = γ|α(i) · (xˆi − E[xi|Hi−1])| ≤ γ‖α(i)‖ · ‖xˆi − E[xi|Hi−1]‖ ≤ 2γ .
By using Azuma’s inequality, we have





Let t = γ
√
2km log (km), then Pr{|Ymk| ≥ γ
√







 ≤ E[|Ymk|] ≤ γ√2km log (km) + 1√km .2γkm = γO(√km log km).

To bound the second term, we use an argument based on Lemma 4.1








Proof of Lemma 3.3.15. Using Lemma 4.1 in Agrawal and Devanur (2015) with






≤ γO(√skm logm) where s =
maxv∈S max j∈[m] v j. Obviously, s = 1m , which completes the proof. 
Using Lemmas 3.3.15 and 3.3.14, combined with the facts that γ ≤ O(1)· OPT(v)k
and k ≥ m logm
η2
, we have E
[∑mk




≤ O(η) OPT(v). Together with (3.7), we
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conclude that E[ALG] ≥ (1−O(η)) OPT(v). This holds conditioned on OPT(v)k ≤ γ ≤
O(1) · OPT(v)k . Moreover, γ is calculated by sampling such that this event happens
with probability at least (1 − η), which completes the proof. 
Lemma 3.3.16. With parameter δ ≥ 0 the welfare (average for the replicas) of the
optimal entropy regularized matching is within an additive δ logm of the welfare of the
optimal matching.
Proof. The entropy −∑i, j xi, j log xi, j is non-negative and maximized with xi, j =
1/m. The maximum value of the entropy term is thus δmk logm. The optimal
objective value of the entropy regularized matching exceeds that of the optimal
matching; thus, its welfare is within an additvie δmk logm of the optimal match-
ing. The average welfare per replica in the entropy regularized matching (recall,
there are mk replicas) is within δ logm of the average welfare per replica on the
optimal matching. 
We conclude the section by combining Lemmas 3.3.12, 3.3.13, and 3.3.16 to
prove the main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.11. Let δ = 3 · 1logm and η = 3 · 1c , where c is a constant such that
competitive ratio of Algorithm 4 is at least 1− c ·η (Lemma 3.3.13). Moreover, let




), to satisfy the required condition in Lemma 3.3.13. The per-
replica welfare of Algorithm 4 is within an additive δ logm = /3 of its entropy
regularized matching objective value, which in turn is a 1−c·η = 1−/3 approxi-
mation to the per-replica optimal value of the entropy regularized matching due
to Lemma 3.3.12 and 3.3.13. Following Lemma 3.3.16, the per-replica optimal
value of the entropy regularized matching is within an additive δ logm = /3
of the per-replica expected welfare of the optimal matching. As the per-replica
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welfare is bounded by 1, the per-replica welfare of the Algorithm 4 is within
an additive /3 + /3 + /3 =  of the per-replica expected welfare of the opti-
mal matching, as claimed. Finally, due to Lemma 3.3.12 and the fact that k is
polynomial in m and 1/, the algorithm’s running time is polynomial in m and
1/. 
3.3.4 The End-to-End BIC Black-box Reduction
We now summarize the proposed BIC black-box reduction. We incorporate our
surrogate selection rule (By using Algorithm 4 as the matching algorithm in
Definition 3.3.5) in the reduction under ideal-model proposed in Hartline et al.
(2015) and we set the market size parameter m accordingly to maintain the wel-
fare preservation property of this reduction.
Definition 3.3.7 (Hartline et al. (2015)). The doubling dimension of a metric
space is the smallest constant ∆ such that every bounded subset S can be parti-
tioned into at most 2 subsets, each having diameter at most half of the diameter
of S .
We now use the following theorem in Hartline et al. (2015), which states the
welfare preservation of the maximum weight replica-surrogate matching in the
ideal model if m is large enough.
Theorem 3.3.17 (Hartline et al. (2015)). For any agent with type space T that has




then the expected per-replica welfare of the maximum matching in the ideal model of
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Hartline et al. (2015) with load k = 1 is within an additive 2 of the expected welfare of
allocationA for that agent.
By using Theorem 3.3.17, we now have the following immediate corollary
by combining Theorem 3.3.11 with Theorem 3.3.17.
Corollary 3.3.18 (BIC black-box reduction). If the market size parameter m is set to
d 12∆+1 e, and the parameters of Algorithm 4 are set as stated in Theorem 3.3.11, then the
composition of surrogate selection rule defined by Algorithm 4 with the allocation A is
(1) a BIC mechanism, (2) the expected welfare is within an additive 3 of the expected
welfare of A for each agent, and (3) its running time is polynomial in n and 1/ given
access to black-box oracleA.8
3.4 Conclusion
We conclude the chapter by summarizing our contributions and going over a
list of related open problems.
3.4.1 Summary
We provided a polynomial time reduction from Bayesian incentive compati-
ble mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design for welfare maximization
problems. Unlike prior results, our reduction achieves exact incentive compati-
bility for problems with multi-dimensional and continuous type spaces.
8Our result obviously holds when the doubling dimensions of type spaces are considered to
be constant. For arbitrary large-dimensional type spaces, the running time is polynomial in n
and 1/∆.
57
The key technical barrier preventing exact incentive compatibility in prior
black-box reductions is that repairing violations of incentive constraints requires
understanding the distribution of the mechanism’s output, which is typically
#P-hard to compute. Reductions that instead estimate the output distribution
by sampling inevitably suffer from sampling error, which typically precludes
exact incentive compatibility. We overcame this barrier by employing and gen-
eralizing the computational model in the literature on Bernoulli Factories. As
discussed in this chapter, in a Bernoulli factory problem one is given a func-
tion mapping the bias of an “input coin” to that of an “output coin”, and the
challenge is to efficiently simulate the output coin given only sample access to
the input coin. We considered a generalization which we called the expectations
from samples computational model, in which a problem instance is specified by a
function mapping the expected values of a set of input distributions to a distri-
bution over outcomes. The challenge is to give a polynomial time algorithm that
exactly samples from the distribution over outcomes given only sample access
to the input distributions.
In this model, we gave a polynomial time algorithm for the function given
by exponential weights: expected values of the input distributions correspond to
the weights of alternatives and we wish to select an alternative with probability
proportional to an exponential function of its weight. This algorithm was the
key ingredient in designing an incentive compatible mechanism for bipartite
matching, which we could use to make the approximately incentive compatible
reduction of Hartline et al. (2015) exactly incentive compatible.
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3.4.2 Open Problems
1. One can think of generalizations of the Bernoulli race problem to other
combinatorial settings. In fact, imagine we have a ground set of elements
and a coin (with unknown bias) corresponding to each element. Moreover,
a feasibility environment, i.e. a collection of subsets of the ground set, is
given. The question is to pick a feasible set in a randomized fashion by
flipping the coins (i.e. sampling), such that the marginal probability that
coin i belongs to the set is proportional to its bias. We already solved the
problem for 1−uniform matroid (Bernoulli race), and solving this problem
for other feasibility environments remain open.
2. Given access to an -BIC mechanism, can one produce an exact BIC mecha-
nism through an efficient black-box reduction that preserves the revenue?




SIMPLE MECHANISMS FOR SINGLE-ITEM REVENUE MAXIMIZATION
Methods from theoretical computer science are amplifying the understanding
of studied phenomena broadly. A quintessential example from auction theory
is the following. Myerson (1981) is oft quoted as showing that the second-price
auction with a reserve price is revenue optimal among all mechanisms for sell-
ing a single item. This result is touted as triumph for microeconomic theory as in
practice reserve-pricing mechanisms are widely prevalent, e.g., eBay’s auction.
A key assumption in this result, though, is that the agents in the auction are
a priori identical; moreover, relaxation of this assumption renders the theoret-
ically optimal auction much more complex and infrequently observed in prac-
tice. Optimality of reserve pricing with agent symmetry, thus, does not explain
its prevalence broadly in asymmetric settings, e.g., eBay’s auction where agents
can be distinguished by public bidding history and reputation. This chapter
considers the approximate optimality of anonymous pricing and auctions with
anonymous reserves, e.g., eBay’s buy-it-now pricing and auction, and justifies
their wide prevalence in asymmetric environments.
Organization of the chapter. In Section 4.1 we define the anonymous pricing
revenue approximation problem and review the literature. In Section 4.2 we
summarize our approach and techniques. In Section 4.3 we give detailed proofs
of our results. Finally, we conclude by summarizing the chapter and proposing
some interesting open problems in Section 4.4.
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4.1 Preliminary
In this section, we give an overview of the problem we are solving in this Chap-
ter. We start by formally defining the worst-case revenue approximation ratio of
anonymous pricing compared to the optimal auction in Section 4.1.1. We then
locate our result in the related literature for this problem in Section 4.1.2.
4.1.1 Problem Definition: Anonymous Pricing vs. Optimal
For selling a single item to agents with independent but non-identically dis-
tributed values, the revenue optimal auction is complex. However, with two
agents, anonymous reserve pricing is a tight two approximation to the opti-
mal auction; moreover, a surprising corollary of a main result of Hartline and
Roughgarden (2009) showed that the second-price auction with anonymous re-
serves is generally no worse than a four approximation. The question of resolv-
ing the approximation factor within [2, 4] has remained open for the last half
decade. Technically, (a) tight methods for understanding symmetric solutions
in asymmetric environments are undeveloped, and (b) the main method for an-
alyzing auction revenue is by Myerson’s virtual values but for this question vir-
tual values give a mixed sign objective that renders challenging the analysis of
approximation. As a way to resolve the anonymous reserve pricing vs. optimal
auction question, we investigate the more demanding problem of approximat-
ing the revenue of the ex ante relaxation of the auction problem by posting an
anonymous price (while supplies last) 1. We consider the Bayesian mechanism
1We would prefer to compare the performance of anonymous pricing directly to the optimal
auction of Myerson (1981); however, the standard formulation of the expected revenue of the
optimal mechanism is difficult to analyze relative to the optimal anonymous pricing.
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design setting for selling a single item described in Chapter 2, Section 2.1, and
use the definitions and notations in Section 2.1 and Section 2.3 heavily in this
chapter.
Definition 4.1.1 (Anonymous pricing vs. optimal revenue auction problem).
In a Bayesian single-item setting with independent and regular agents, analyze
the worst-case approximation ratio of the revenue of the ex ante relaxation to





where REG denotes the space of all regular instances.
4.1.2 Related Work
This chapter is part of a central area of study at the intersection of computer
science and economics that aims to quantify the performance of simple, prac-
tical mechanisms versus optimal mechanisms (see Hartline, 2013, for a sur-
vey). Immediately related results in this area fit in to three broad categories,
(i) anonymous and discriminatory reserve pricing (Hartline and Roughgarden,
2009), (ii) while-supplies-last posted pricing (Chawla et al., 2010a), and (iii) in-
creased competition with symmetric (Bulow and Klemperer, 1996) and asym-
metric agents (Hartline and Roughgarden, 2009). The four approximation of
Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) for anonymous reserve pricing is a corollary
of their result for (iii) on (i). In comparison this chapter considers (ii), foremost,
and obtain a lower bound for (i) as a corollary.
62
4.2 Our Approach in a Nutshell
The four approximation of Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) employs the only
known approach for resolving (b), an approximate extension of the main theo-
rem of Bulow and Klemperer (1996). Our approach directly takes on the chal-
lenge of (a) by giving a tight analysis of anonymous pricing versus a standard
upper bound (described later in this chapter); corollaries of this analysis are
tightened upper bounds on approximation of the optimal auction from four to
e ≈ 2.718 for both anonymous pricing and anonymous reserves. We conclude
that, up to an e factor, discrimination and simultaneity are unimportant for driv-
ing revenue in single-item auctions.
4.2.1 Ex Ante Relaxation as a Benchmark
In the Bayesian single-item auction problem agents’ values are drawn from a
product distribution and expected revenue with respect to the distribution is to
be optimized. Our development of the approximation bound for anonymous
pricing and reserves is based on the analysis of four classes of mechanisms:
1. Ex ante relaxation (a discriminatory pricing): An ex ante pricing relaxes
the feasibility constraint of the auction problem, from selling at most one
item ex post, to selling at most one item in expectation over the draws of
agents’ values, i.e., ex ante. Fixing a probability of serving a given agent
the optimal ex ante mechanism offers this agent a posted price irrespective
of the outcome of the mechanism for the other agents. This relaxation was
identified as a quantity of interest in Chawla et al. (2007) and its study was
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refined by Alaei (2011) and Yan (2011).
2. Auction: An auction is any mechanism that maps values to outcome and
payments subject to incentive and feasibility constraints. The optimal
auction was characterized by Myerson (1981) and this characterization,
though complex, is the foundation of modern auction theory.
3. Anonymous reserve: An anonymous reserve mechanisms is a variant of
the second-price auction where bids below an anonymous reserve are dis-
carded, the winner is the highest of the remaining agents, and the price
charged is the maximum of the remaining agents’ bids or the reserve if
none other remain.
4. Anonymous pricing: An anonymous pricing mechanism posts an anony-
mous price and the first agent to arrive who is willing to pay this price will
buy the item.
For any distribution over agents’ values the optimal revenue attainable by each
of these classes of mechanisms is non-increasing with respect to the above or-
dering. The final inequality of optimal anonymous reserve exceeding optimal
anonymous pricing follows as with equal reserve and price, the former has only
higher revenue as competition drives a higher price. The ex ante relaxation is a
quantity for analysis only, while the other problems yield relevant mechanisms.
4.2.2 Anonymous Pricing vs. Ex Ante Relaxation
Our main technical theorem identifies the supremum over all instances of the
ratio of the revenues of the optimal ex ante relaxation to the optimal anonymous
pricing as the solution to an equation which evaluates to e. To our knowledge,
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this evaluation is not by any standard progressions or limits that where pre-
viously known to evaluate to e. The theorem assumes that the distribution of
agents’ values satisfies a standard regularity property that is satisfied by com-
mon distributions, e.g., uniform, normal, exponential; without this assumption
we show that the approximation factor is n for n-agent environments (see Sec-
tion 4.3.3).
Theorem 4.2.1 (Anonymous pricing versus ex ante relaxation). For a single item
environment with agents with independently (but non-identically) distributed values
from regular distributions, the worst case approximation factor of anonymous pricing








which evaluates to e ≈ 2.718 where












Intuition for the theorem, as given by functions V(·) and Q(·), and its proof
is as follows. We write a mathematical program to maximize the worst case
approximation factor; a tight-in-the-limit continuous relaxation of this program
gives the objective 1 +V(p) subject to Q(p) ≤ 1 which has the following inter-
pretation. There is a continuum of agents and each agent value distribution is
given by a pointmass at a value with some probability (and then a continuous
distribution below the pointmass to minimally satisfy the regularity property).
The functionV(p) is the expected pointmass value from agents with pointmass
value at least price p;2 Q(p) is the expected number of these agents to realize
their pointmass value. The optimal p∗ meets the constraint with equality, i.e.,
Q(p∗) = 1.
Corollaries of this theorem are the improved upper bounds by e (from 4) on
the worst-case approximation factor of anonymous reserves and anonymous
2V(·) excludes the contribution from the “highest valued agent” which is 1; hence the objec-
tive 1 +V(p).
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Figure 4.1: Revenue gap between mechanisms of study.
pricing with respect to the optimal auction. On the worst case instance of the
theorem, however, the actual approximation factor of anonymous reserve and
anonymous pricing are 2 and 2.23, respectively (see Section 4.3.4 of the Ap-
pendix). The latter improves on the known lower bound of two; the former
does not improve the known lower bound. The question of refining our un-
derstanding of the revenue of anonymous reserves on worst-case instances and
identifying a tight bound with respect to the optimal auction remains open. See
Figure 4.1 (In this figure, the asterisk symbol ∗ denotes new bounds derived in
this chapter).
4.2.3 Implications on Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design
The corollary relating anonymous pricing to the optimal auction has implica-
tions on mechanism design for agents with multi-dimensional preferences (e.g.,
for multiple items; cf. Chawla et al., 2007). Understanding these problems,
though there has been considerable recent progress, remains an area with fun-
damental open questions for optimization and approximation. Recently, Hagh-
panah and Hartline (2014) proved the optimality of uniform pricing for a single
unit-demand buyer with values drawn from a large family of item-symmetric
distributions. An immediate corollary of our anonymous pricing result is that,
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for a unit-demand buyer with values drawn from an asymmetric product dis-
tribution, uniform pricing is an e approximation (improved from four) to the
optimal non-uniform pricing (cf. Cai and Daskalakis, 2011) and, via a result
of Chawla et al. (2010b), a 2e approximation to the optimal pricing over lot-
teries (i.e., randomized allocations, improved from eight). Further refinement
of this latter bound remains an important open question. These approxima-
tion results for a single agent automatically improve the approximation bounds
for related multi-agent mechanism design problems based on uniform pricing,
e.g., from Alaei et al. (2013). As one example, for selling an object that can be
configured on sale in one of m configurations to n agents with independently
(but non-identically) distributed values for each configuration (also satisfying a
regularity property), the second-price auction with an anonymous reserve that
configures the object as the winner most prefers is a 2e2 ≈ 14.8 approximation
to the optimal auction (which is sometimes randomized; improved from 32).
4.2.4 Worst-case Analysis in Mechanism Design
The field of algorithmic mechanism design contains many questions of constant
approximation where tight bounds are not known. A key challenge of these
problems is that the worst-case bounds are not given by small instances, e.g., n =
2 agents, but are instead approached in the limit with n. The field lacks general
methods for analysis of this kind of problem. Our approach is similar to the
recent successful approach of Chen et al. (2014) which identified the prior-free
approximation ratio for digital good auctions as 2.42 (matching the lower bound
of Goldberg et al., 2006). The approach at the first step writes the approximation
ratio as the value of a mathematical program. In both our problem and that
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of Chen et al. (2014) the worst-case instance is attained in the limit with the
number n of agents. With two success stories for this approach in algorithmic
mechanism design, we are optimistic about the development of a set of tools for
analyzing worst case approximation factors and that these tools will be useful
for making progress on many other similar open questions in the area.
4.2.5 Organization of the Technical Parts
In Section 4.3.1, we provide details of our e-approximation in the worst-case for
anonymous pricing versus ex ante relaxation when the valuations are indepen-
dent and regular. Then, we prove this approximation ratio is indeed tight in
Section 4.3.2. In Section 4.3.3 we consider the single item environment with in-
dependent but irregular agent value distributions and we show no better than
an n-approximation is possible with respect to the optimal auction. In the same
section, we also prove the n-approximation is tight. Finally, in Section 4.3.4, we
develop lower-bounds on the approximation ratios of the anonymous pricing
and reserve versus optimal auction (under regularity assumption) through sim-
ulating different hard instances. These hard instances are exactly the identified
worst-case instances in Section 4.3.1 and Section 4.3.2 for the anonymous pricing
versus ex ante problem.
4.3 Detailed Results: e-approximation in the Worst-case
In this section, we show matching upper and lower bounds for the approxi-
mation ratio of anonymous pricing versus ex ante relaxation. We then further
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investigate the necessity of regularity assumption. Finally, we conclude by pro-
viding a couple of simulations that lead us to find lower-bounds for approxima-
tion ratios of anonymous pricing and reserve auction with respect to the optimal
revenue auction.
4.3.1 Upper-bound Analysis
Program (P1) defines a tight upper bound on the ratio, denoted by ρ, of the rev-
enue of the ex ante relaxation to the revenue of the optimal anonymous pricing.
This program can be thought of as a continuous optimization problem over reg-
ular distributions with the objective of maximizing the aforementioned ratio. To
get our result in this section, we develop techniques to upper-bound the value
of this program. In Section 4.3.2, we show our relaxation is indeed tight.
Overview of the Upper-bound Analysis
By normalizing the optimal anonymous pricing revenue to be one, (P1) is equiv-




subject to PRICEREV(I, p) ≤ 1 ∀p ≥ 1. (P2.1)
Note that PRICEREV(I, p) < 1 for p ∈ [0, 1), so it is safe to assume prices are
in range [1,+∞). We show that for any fixed n the supremum of this program
is approached even when restricting to triangular revenue curve instances, i.e.,
ones of the form {Tri(v¯i, q¯i)}ni=1 with
∑
i q¯i ≤ 1 as defined in Section 2.1. Conse-
quently, the problem is reduced to a discrete optimization problem over vari-
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ables v¯ , (v¯1, . . . , v¯n) and q¯ , (q¯1, . . . , q¯n). An assignment for this optimization
problem refers to a pair (v¯, q¯). This optimization problem is still of infinite
dimension because n is itself a variable. It also turns out to be highly non-
convex. Re-index v¯ such that v¯1 ≥ . . . ≥ v¯n. We will show that, for any fixed
n, inequality (P2.1) can be assumed without loss of generality to be tight for all
p ∈ {v¯1, . . . , v¯n}; otherwise an instance for which at least one of these constraints is
not tight could be modified to make all these constraints tight while improving
the objective. Thus,
PRICEREV({Tri(v¯i, q¯i)}ni=1, v¯k) = 1 ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n} . (4.1)
Observe that for each k ∈ {1, . . . , n} the left hand side of equation (4.1) only
depends on the first k agents, because the valuations of the rest of the agents
are always below v¯k. Consequently once v¯1, . . . , v¯n are fixed, we can compute
q¯1, . . . , q¯n by solving equation (4.1) for k ∈ {1, . . . , n} and using forward substi-
tution. Unfortunately, the resulting formulation of q¯k in terms of v¯1, . . . , v¯k is
difficult to analyze directly for k ≥ 2. Instead, we relax inequality (P2.1) in such
a way that it leads to a tractable formulation of q¯ in terms of v¯. We also show that
the relaxed inequality is tight which implies the value of the relaxed program is
equal to that of the original program. Finally, we show that the supremum of
the relaxed program is attained when n→ ∞, and roughly speaking the instance
converges to a continuum of infinitesimal agents with triangular revenue curve
distributions. For this continuum of agents, ρ is given simply by the optimiza-
tion of p in the objective 1 +V(p) subject to the constraint Q(p) ≤ 1 for the two
functionsV(·) and Q(·) given in the statement of Theorem 4.2.1.
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Reduction to Triangular Revenue Curve Instances
We begin by showing that without loss of generality we can restrict program
(P2) to triangle revenue curve instances.
Lemma 4.3.1. The supremum of program (P2) is approached by triangle revenue curve
instances, i.e., of the form Iˆ = {Tri(v¯i, q¯i)}ni=1 with
∑n
i=1 q¯i ≤ 1.
Proof. We will show that for any regular instance I = {Fi}ni=1, there exists a corre-
sponding instance Iˆ = {Tri(v¯i, q¯i)}ni=1 with
∑n
i=1 q¯i ≤ 1 yielding the same optimal ex
ante revenue and (weakly) smaller expected revenue from the optimal anony-
mous price.
Let q¯ be an optimal assignment for the ex ante relaxation program (2.5) that
computes EXANTEREV(I). Set v¯i ← Ri(q¯i)/q¯i for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where Ri is
the revenue curve of Fi. We show changing agent i’s valuation distribution to
Tri(v¯i, q¯i) can only decrease the revenue of any anonymous pricing (PRICEREV)
while preserving the revenue of the ex ante relaxation (EXANTEREV), which
implies the statement of the Lemma 4.3.1.
Let Rˆi be the revenue curve of Tri(v¯i, q¯i). Observe that the change of distribu-
tions does not affect EXANTEREV because Rˆi(q¯i) = Ri(q¯i) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and
Rˆi is a lower bound on Ri elsewhere as Ri is concave (see Figure 4.2). Therefore
the replacement preserves the optimal value of convex program of Definition 2.5
which implies EXANTEREV(Iˆ) = EXANTEREV(I).
Next, we show the replacement may only decrease the value of PRICEREV(p)
at any p > 0. Fix a price p, and consider the price line corresponding to p, that is,







Ri: black, Rˆi: red.








Figure 4.3: Intersection of revenue curve and price line p.
the probability of agent i’s valuation being above p is equal to the q at which
Ri(q) intersects price line p. Given that Rˆi is a lower bound on Ri everywhere,
the replacement may only decrease the probability of agent i’s valuation being
above p. Consequently, given that agents’ valuations are distributed indepen-
dently, the replacement may only decrease the revenue from sale at any anony-
mous price p, which implies PRICEREV(Iˆ) ≤ PRICEREV(I). 
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Combining Definition 4.3.1 with the algebraic formulation of PRICEREV and
EXANTEREV from equations 2.8 and 2.7 (Chapter 2, Section 2.1) yields the fol-















v¯i ≥ 0, q¯i ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} .
Relaxations and Canonical Assignments
In this section we find a relaxation of program (P3) where the corresponding
pricing revenue constraint (P3.1) is tight for all p ∈ {v¯1, . . . , v¯n} and can thus be
written as a program on variables v¯ alone (i.e., by solving for the appropriate
q¯ in terms of v¯). To simplify the solution of q¯ in terms of v¯, we will first make
a series of relaxations to the pricing revenue constraint (P3.1). We will point
which of these relaxations are obviously tight, and the others we will prove to
be tight in the limit with the number of agents n in Section 4.3.2, where we derive
the matching lower bound.
Lemma 4.3.2 formalizes these relaxations as sketched below, the formal proof
is given in the appendix, Section B.1. First, observe that the pricing revenue
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The first relaxation drops the constraint on p < {v¯1, . . . , v¯n}; this is without loss
as the optimal anonymous price is always in {v¯1, . . . , v¯n}. We re-index such that













∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n} .
As the second relaxation we drop the term (1 − q¯i) from the denominator of the














∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n} .













 v¯2k(v¯k − 1)(v¯k + v¯1q¯1)
 ∀k ∈ {2, . . . , n} .
The previous relaxation uses the fact that 1a ln(1+b) ≤ ln(1+ ba ) for all a ≥ 1, b ≥ 0.
In the proof, we will also show that v¯1q¯1 can be replaced with 1 both in the
above constraint and in the objective function without loss of generality. Putting




















v¯i+1 ≤ v¯i, ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}
v¯i ≥ 0, q¯i ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} .





is defined in Theorem 4.2.1.
Lemma 4.3.2. The value of program (P4), denoted by ρ′, is an upper bound on the
value of program (P3) which is ρ.
Next we show that we can assume without loss of generality the pricing rev-
enue constraint (P4.1) is tight for all k ∈ {2, . . . , n} in program (P4). That will
allow us to specify one set of variables (e.g., q¯) in terms of the other set of vari-
ables (e.g., v¯), which consequently allows us to eliminate the former variables
and drop the pricing revenue constraint (P4.1). To this end, we first define a
canonical feasible solution for (P4), restriction to which is without loss as given
by Lemma 4.3.3.
Definition 4.3.1. A feasible assignment (v¯, q¯) for (P4) is canonical if the pricing
constraint (P4.1) is tight for all k ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
Lemma 4.3.3. For any feasible assignment (v¯, q¯) for (P4), there exists an equivalent







Proof. Without loss of generality assume q¯k > 0 for all k ∈ {2, . . . , n}.3 The right
hand side of the pricing constraint (P4.1) is V(v¯k) which is decreasing in v¯k (see
Lemma 4.3.4) and approaches 0 as v¯k → ∞, so for every k ∈ {2, . . . , n} there exists







= V(v¯′k) ∀k ∈ {2, . . . , n} .
Observe that by the above construction we always have v¯′2 ≥ . . . ≥ v¯′n. We then
decrease q¯k to q¯′k = q¯k
v¯k
v¯′k
for each k ∈ {2, . . . , n} to obtain the desired assignment
(v¯′, q¯′). 
By Lemma 4.3.3, we can restrict our attention to canonical assignments of
(P4) without loss of generality. In particular, we can fully identify such a canon-





∀k ∈ {2, . . . , n} . (4.2)







subject to q¯k =
eV(v¯k)−V(v¯k−1) − 1
v¯k
∀k ∈ {2, . . . , n} (P5.1)
n∑
i=2
q¯i ≤ 1 (P5.2)
v¯i+1 ≤ v¯i, ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}
v¯i ≥ 0, q¯i ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} .
3If q¯k = 0, we can drop agent k without affecting feasibility or objective value.
76
Continuum of Agents.
Given that n itself is a variable, a solution to program (P5) can be practically
specified by a finite subset v¯ ⊂ R+ where v¯i is the ith largest value in that subset.
We now show that the optimal solution to program (P5) corresponds to v¯ =
[p,∞) (for some p > 1) which can be viewed as an instance with infinitely many
infinitesimal agents (i.e., with q¯i going to zero).
For any given p′ > p > 1, we define a continuum of agents [p, p′) by defining
for each m ∈ N a discrete family of agents of size m spanning [p, p′) and by
taking the limit of this family as m → ∞. Formally, for each m ∈ N, we consider
the family of agents with distributions {Tri(u j, (eV(u j)−V(u j−1)−1)/u j)}mj=1 where u j =




eV(v)−V(v+δ) − 1v · 1δ
 = −V′(v)v .
Therefore in a continuum of agents [p, p′) each infinitesimal agent v ∈ [p, p′) has
a distribution of Tri(v,−V′(v)v dv), which implies that the contribution of [p, p′) to
the objective value of (P5) is∫ p′
p
v · (−V′(v)v ) dv = V(p) −V(p′), (4.3)
and the contribution of [p, p′) to the left hand side of the constraint (P5.2), i.e.∑
i q¯i ≤ 1 which is referred to as the capacity constraint, is∫ p′
p
−V′(v)v dv = Q(p) − Q(p′), (4.4)
where Q(p) = ∫ ∞
p
−1vV′(v) dv as defined in Theorem 4.2.1.
Via the above derivation of a continuum of agents, program (P5), on the
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subject to Q(p) ≤ 1. .
Next we will sketch a construction that demonstrates that any feasible solu-
tion v¯ = (v¯1, . . . , v¯n) to program (P5) can be replaced by a continuum of agents
that corresponds to an interval [p,∞) (for some p > 1 to be determined) and
the objective of (P5) is strictly increased. Note that v¯1 does not appear any-
where in (P5); for notational convenience we redefine it as v¯1 = ∞. Suppose for
each i ∈ {2, . . . , n} we replace the agent v¯i with the continuum of agents [v¯i, v¯i−1).
It follows from equations 4.3 and 4.2 that this replacement changes the object
value of (P5) by V(v¯i) − V(v¯i−1) − v¯iq¯i = ln(1 + v¯iq¯i) − v¯iq¯i < 0 which is unfortu-
nately always negative and thus the opposite of what we want to prove. On
the other hand, it follows from equations 4.4 and 4.2 that this replacement also
changes the left hand side of the capacity constraint (P5.2) by Q(v¯i) − Q(v¯i−1) − q¯i
which is also negative (as we will show later), and thus creates some slack in
the capacity constraint (P5.2). Summing over the slack created in the capacity
constraint (P5.2) from converting each agent to a continuum, we can add a new
continuum of agents [p, v¯n) where p < v¯n is chosen to make the capacity con-
straint (P5.2) tight. As a consequence of the following claims, the net change in
the objective value from this transformation is positive.
1. The amount of slack created in the capacity constraint (P5.2) by replacing
v¯i with [v¯i, v¯i−1) is more than the decrease in the objective value of (P5). By
using equations 4.3 and 4.4, we can formally write this claim as
q¯i − (Q(v¯i) − Q(v¯i−1)) > v¯iq¯i − (V(v¯i) −V(v¯i−1)).
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This is proved below in Lemma 4.3.6.
2. If there is a slack of ∆ > 0 in the capacity constraint (P5.2), it can be used
to extend the last continuum of agents to increase the objective value by
more than ∆. Using equations 4.3 and 4.4, we can formalize this claim as
follows: if p is chosen such that Q(p) − Q(v¯n) = ∆, then V(p) − V(v¯n) > ∆.
This is proved below in Lemma 4.3.4.
The suggestion from the above construction is that from any solution v¯ to
program (P5), a price p can be identified such that the continuum of agents on
[p,∞) has higher objective value. In other words, the optimal values of pro-
gram (P5) and program (P6) are equal. This is proved below in Lemma 4.3.7;
though we defer the proof that the solution of program (P6) corresponds to a
limit solution of program (P5) to Section 4.3.2.
Algebraic Upper-bound Proof
The rest of this section develops a formal but purely algebraic proof that is based
on the approach sketched in the previous paragraphs. The proofs of the first two
lemmas, below, can be found in the appendix, Section B.1.
Lemma 4.3.4. The functionsV(p), Q(p), andV(p) − Q(p) are all decreasing in p, for
p > 1.
Lemma 4.3.5. for any p′ > p > 1 the following inequality holds: V(p) − V(p′) <
ln( pp−1 ) − ln( p
′
p′−1 ) .
Lemma 4.3.6. For any p′ > p > 1 and q = e
V(p)−V(p′)−1
p the following inequalities hold:
q − (Q(p) − Q(p′)) ≥ pq − (V(p) −V(p′)) ≥ 0 (4.5)
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Proof. Define
W(p, p′) , V(p) − Q(p) −V(p′) + Q(p′) + q − pq






Now, observe that proving the first inequality in the statement of the lemma is
equivalent to proving W(p, p′) > 0. We instead prove that W(p, p′) is increasing
in p′ which together with the trivial fact that W(p, p) = 0 implies W(p, p′) > 0.
∂
∂p′W(p, p























where the final inequality follows from Lemma 4.3.4 and Lemma 4.3.5: by
Lemma 4.3.4, − ∂
∂p′V(p′) > 0; and by Lemma 4.3.5, eV(p)−V(p





p′−1 ), so replacing the former with the latter only decreases the value
of the expression inside the brackets because its coefficient is − p−1p which is neg-
ative.
The second inequality in the statement of the lemma follows trivially from
the fact thatV(p)−V(p′) = ln(1+ pq) thus pq− (V(p)−V(p′)) = pq− ln(1+ pq) >
0. 
Lemma 4.3.7. The value of program (P6), denoted by ρ′′, is an upper bound on the
value of program (P5) which is ρ′.
Proof. Let (v¯, q¯) be any arbitrary feasible assignment for program (P5). We show
there exists a feasible assignment for program (P6) with objective value upper
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bounding the objective value of (v¯, q¯) in program (P5). Define p∗ , Q−1(1), a
candidate solution to program (P6) that meets the feasibility constraint with
equality. Note that such a p∗ exists because Q(∞) = 0, Q(1) = ∞, and Q(·) is








V(v¯k) −V(v¯k−1) − (Q(v¯k) − Q(v¯k−1)) + q¯k
)
[(4.3.6) & v¯1 = ∞]
= 1 +V(v¯n) − Q(v¯n) +
n∑
k=2
q¯k asV(∞) = Q(∞)




< 1 +V(p∗) − Q(p∗) + 1 as proved below
(∗)
= 1 +V(p∗) as Q(p∗) = 1.
To prove inequality (∗) we show that p∗ < v¯n which together with Lemma 4.3.4





i=2Q(v¯i)−Q(v¯i−1) = Q(v¯n). On the other hand
∑n
i=2 q¯i ≤ 1. There-
fore Q(v¯n) < 1 which implies v¯n > p∗ because Q(p∗) = 1 and, by Lemma 4.3.4, Q(·)
is decreasing. 
We conclude the section with the proof of the upper-bound of Theorem 4.2.1.
Proof of upper-bound in Theorem 4.2.1. By putting all the pieces together, it fol-
lows from program (P1), Lemma 4.3.1, Lemma 4.3.2, Lemma 4.3.3, and the
rest of the discussion in this section that ρ′ which is computed by (P5) is
an upper bound on the ratio of the ex ante relaxation to the expected rev-
enue of the optimal anonymous pricing. Following Lemma 4.3.7, ρ′ is upper
bounded by the objective value of program (P6), i.e. ρ′′. As Q(·) and V(·) are
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decreasing (Lemma 4.3.4), the optimal solution to program (P6) is given by
ρ′′ = 1 +V(Q−1(1)) which numerically evaluates to e ≈ 2.718. 
4.3.2 Lower-Bound Analysis
In this section we show the tightness of our approximation, i.e. the matching
lower-bound in Theorem 4.2.1. As a result of Lemma 4.3.1, it suffices to prove
the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3.8. For any  > 0 there exists a feasible assignment (n, v¯, q¯) of the program
(P3) such that
∑n
i=1 v¯iq¯i ≥ 1 +V(Q−1(1)) − .
Proof. Pick δ > 0 such that:
(1 − δ)2
1 +V (Q−1 ( 1(1+δ)2 ) + δ) ≥ 1 +V(Q−1(1)) − 
This is always possible as V and Q are decreasing. Lets define λ = Q−1(1). The
proof is done in two steps:
Step 1: We find {vi, qi}ni=2 such that
n∑
i=2
qi ≤ 1 , k = 2, . . . , n :
k∑
i=2












In our construction for {vi, qi}ni=2, we use two parameters ∆ > 0 and VT ≥ λ




. Now, let n = max{n0 ∈ N : ∑n0i=2 qi ≤ 1}. Obviously, ∑ni=2 qi ≤ 1.
Moreover, for any 2 ≤ k ≤ n we have ∑ki=2 ln(1 + viqi) = ∑ki=2(V(vi) − V(vi−1)) =
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V(vk) −V(v1) = V(vk). Now, pick δ′ > 0 small enough such that for x ∈ [0, δ′] we
have e
x−1
x ≤ 1 + δ. Moreover, let ∆ to be small enough and VT to be large enough
such that max{V(λ) − V(λ + ∆),V(VT ),∆} ≤ min{δ, δ′}. First observe that due to
Lemma 4.3.6 qi ≥ Q(vi) −Q(vi−1) which implies 2 ≥ ∑ni=1 qi ≥ Q(vn) −Q(v1) = Q(vn).
So, all values vi are at least equal to λ. As V(.) is convex over [1,∞), we have




≤ (1 + δ)V(vi) −V(vi−1)
vi











Q′(v) dv = (1 + δ)






≤ (1 + δ)
Q(vi) − Q(vi−1) + ∆ ∫ vi−1
vi
−Q′(v) dv
 ≤ (1 + δ)2(Q(vi) − Q(vi−1)) (4.6)
Based on the definition of n (number of distributions in our instance), we have
1 <
∑n+1
i=2 qi. By (4.6), we have
∑n+1
i=2 qi ≤ (1+δ)2
∑n+1
i=2 ((Q(vi)−Q(vi−1)) = (1+δ)2Q(vn+1).





. We conclude that λ′ ≥ vn+1. Hence, vn ≤ λ′+∆ ≤ λ′+δ.
















where the last inequality holds as vn ≤ λ′ + δ andV is decreasing over [1,∞).
Step 2: Given {vi, qi}ni=2, we find an instance {v¯i, q¯i}ni=1 such that is feasible for pro-
gram (P3) and
∑n
i=1 v¯iq¯i ≥ 1 +V(Q−1(1)) − . To do so, set q1 = δ, v1 = 1δ − 1. Now,




= (1 + viqi)
1
vk (4.8)
and then let q¯i = (1 − δ)(1 − maxk∈[2:n]γi,k)qi and v¯i = vi, for i ∈ [2 : n]. Now we claim
{v¯i, q¯i}ni=1 is a feasible assignment for the program (P3) . We have
n∑
i=1





γi,k)qi ≤ δ + (1 − δ)
n∑
i=2




















































By taking exponents from both sides and rearranging the terms it is not hard
to see (n, v¯, q¯) is a feasible assignment of program (P3). Additionally, for a fixed
VT all of the vi’s are bounded, i.e. 1 ≤ vi ≤ VT . So, as ∆ goes to zero we have
viqi → 0 as qi → 0, and the left hand side of (4.8) converges to its right hand side.
As a result, for small enough ∆, we can guarantee γi,k ≤ δ for all i, k, and hence
q¯i ≥ (1 − δ)2qi. So
n∑
i=1










≥ (1 − δ2)
1 +V (Q−1 ( 1(1+δ)2 ) + δ)
which implies
∑n
i=1 v¯iq¯i ≥ 1 +V(Q−1(1)) − , as desired. 
4.3.3 Irregular inapproximability results
In this section we show that anonymous pricing and anonymous reserves are a
tight n approximation to the optimal auction and ex ante relaxation. Specifically,
we show a lower bound on the approximation factor of anonymous reserves to
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the optimal auction and an upper bound on the approximation factor of anony-
mous pricing to the ex ante relaxation. The ordering of these mechanisms by
revenue then implies that all bounds are optimal and tight.
Proposition 4.3.9. For n-agent, independent, non-identical, and irregular distribu-
tions the second-price auction with anonymous reserves is at best an n approximation
to the optimal single-item auction.
Proof. Consider the following value distribution
vi =

hi with probabiliy h−i,
0 otherwise.
On this distribution the ex ante relaxation has revenue
∑n
i=0 h
ih−i = n (and the op-
timal auction is no better). On the other hand, anonymous reserve and anony-
mous pricing of hi for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} gives revenue at least one. We will show
that in the limit as h approaches infinity; these bounds are tight.
We first argue that in the limit of h the optimal auction revenue is n (the
same as the ex ante relaxation). Consider the expected revenue of the follow-
ing sequential posted pricing mechanism, which gives a lower-bound on the
optimal revenue.4 In decreasing order of price and until the first agent accepts
her offered price, offer each agent i price hi. This mechanism’s revenue can be
calculated as:











(1 − 1hn− j+1 )
which converges to n as h goes to infinity.
4In fact, this sequential posted pricing mechanism is the optimal auction, but its optimality
is unnecessary for the proof so we omit the details.
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We now prove that the expected revenue of the second-price auction with
any anonymous reserve in {hi}ni=1 is at most one in the limit. (Any other reserve
is only worse.) In the second-price auction with reserve, the winner pays the
maximum of the highest agent value below her value and the reserve. An upper
bound of this revenue is the sum of such a payment over all agents with values
at least the reserve. So, for reserve hi the contribution of j ≥ i to this upper
bound is at most:
h− j ( j − i + hi). (4.10)
The first term, above, is the probability that agent j has high value h j. Con-
ditioned on her having the high value h j, the second term bounds the agent’s
payment, the expected maximum of the highest lower-valued agent and the re-
serve hi. It is at most j − i + hi as each agent between i and j has expected value
one and the expectation of their maximum is at most the sum of their expecta-
tions. It follows from equation (4.10) that in the limit with h, the contribution
from agent i to this bound is one and the contribution from agent j , i is zero.
Thus, the expected revenue of the second-price auction with reserve hi is at most
one in the limit. 
Proposition 4.3.10. For independent, non-identical, irregular n-agent single-item en-
vironments, anonymous pricing is at worst an n approximation to the ex ante relaxation.
Proof. Define {(v¯i, q¯i)}ni=1 as in equation (2.8) in Section 2.1 where the ex ante re-
laxation posts price v¯i to agent i which is accepted with probability q¯i and has
total revenue
∑n
i=1 v¯i q¯i. For any i the anonymous pricing that posts price v¯i ob-
tains at least revenue v¯i q¯i. Thus, picking a uniformly random price from {v¯i}ni=1
gives an n approximation to the ex ante relaxation revenue
∑n
i=1 v¯i q¯i. The optimal
anonymous price is no worse. 
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4.3.4 Simulation results
In this section, we briefly discuss simulation results for the worst-case instance
derived in Section 4.3.1. From these simulations we will see how fast, as a func-
tion of the number n of agents, the worst-case ratio of the ex ante relaxation to
the expected revenue of optimal anonymous pricing converges to e. Moreover,
for these worst-case instances we will be able to evaluate the approximation of
the optimal auction by anonymous reserves and pricing.
We find a discrete approximation to the continuum instance of the upper
bound as follows. As described in Section 4.3.1, it is without loss to assume that
every anonymous pricing obtains the same revenue. For any {q¯i}ni=1 that sum
to one, a decreasing sequence {v¯i}ni=1 can be identified inductively as v¯k can be
determined from {(v¯i, q¯i)}k−1i=1 by binary search and revenue calculations. Any se-
quence of {q¯i}ni=1, thus, gives a lower bound on the ratio of the ex ante relaxation
to the anonymous pricing. One such sequence is q¯i = 1/n for all i. We employ
a sequence in our simulations that converges faster. Specifically we set {q¯i}ni=1 as
the arithmetic progression that evenly divides [0, 2n ] (it can be easily verified that
this sums to one as required).
After generating the instances, we also calculate the ratio of the revenue
of the optimal mechanism to the anonymous pricing revenue, and the ratio
of the revenue of the optimal mechanism to the revenue of the second price
with anonymous reserve mechanism for these instances. We use sampling al-
gorithm to calculate the revenue of the second price with anonymous reserve
mechanism, while the calculation of the revenue of the optimal mechanism is
exact. We report the results of our simulation in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.4 for
various numbers n of agents. In the Table 4.1, EXANTEREV and OPTPRICEREV
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are the ex ante relaxation and optimal anonymous pricing revenues (as pre-
viously defined). OPTREV is the revenue of the optimal auction of Myerson
(1981). OPTRESERVEREV is the revenue obtained by the second-price auction
with an optimally chosen reserve price. In the Figure 4.4 the red sold line rep-
resents the ratio of ex-ante benchmark to anonymous pricing revenue. The blue
line with star represents the ratio of the optimal revenue to anonymous pricing
revenue. The black line with circle represents the ratio of the optimal revenue
to the revenue of the second price auction with reserve.
n 2 10 100 500 1000 5000
EXANTEREV/OPTPRICEREV 2.000 2.622 2.710 2.717 2.718 2.718
OPTREV/OPTPRICEREV 2.000 2.187 2.227 2.231 2.231 2.232
OPTREV/OPTRESERVEREV 2.000 1.731 1.676 1.665 1.659 1.607
Table 4.1: The ratios of the revenues of various auctions and benchmarks.












Figure 4.4: The ratios of the revenues of various auctions and benchmarks.
We conclude this section by highlighting the following theorem, derived
from the table in Table 4.1.
Theorem 4.3.11. There exists an instance for which anonymous pricing is a 2.232
approximation to the optimal auction.
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4.4 Conclusion
We conclude the chapter by summarizing our contributions and going over a
list of related open problems.
4.4.1 Summary
For selling a single item to agents with independent but non-identically dis-
tributed values, the revenue optimal auction is complex. With respect to it,
Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) showed that the approximation factor of the
second-price auction with an anonymous reserve is between two and four. We
considered the more demanding problem of approximating the revenue of the
ex ante relaxation of the auction problem by posting an anonymous price (while
supplies last) and proved that their worst-case ratio is e. As a corollary, the
upper-bound of anonymous pricing or anonymous reserves versus the optimal
auction improves from four to e. We concluded that, up to an e factor, discrimi-
nation and simultaneity are unimportant for driving revenue in single-item auc-
tions.
4.4.2 Open Problems
1. In terms of expected revenue, what is the right approximation gap be-
tween anonymous pricing and optimal revenue auction? Our analysis
shows the there is a tight multiplicative gap of e between the former and
ex ante relaxation, and finding the tight gap with respect to the optimal
auction remained open.
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2. In terms of expected revenue, what is the right approximation gap be-
tween second price auction with anonymous reserve and either of optimal
revenue auction or ex ante relaxation?
3. Can our style of worst-case analysis and characterizing the worst-case in-
stance be used for other questions in mechanism design?
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CHAPTER 5
ONLINE MECHANISMS FOR REVENUE MAXIMIZATION
In this chapter, we consider the following revenue maximization problem in a
repeated setting, called the online posted pricing problem. In each period, the
seller has a single item to sell, and a new prospective buyer. The seller offers to
sell the item to the buyer at a given price; the buyer buys the item if and only if
the price is below his private valuation for the item. The private valuation of the
buyer itself is never revealed to the seller. We now cab ask the following ques-
tions: How should a monopolistic seller iteratively set the prices if he wishes to
maximize his revenue? What if he also cares about market share?
Estimating price sensitivities and demand models in order to optimize rev-
enue and market share is the bedrock of econometrics. The emergence of online
marketplaces has enabled sellers to costlessly change prices, as well as collect
huge amounts of data. This has renewed the interest in understanding best
practices for data driven pricing. The extreme case of this when the price is
updated for each buyer is the online pricing problem described above; one can
always use this for less frequent price updates. Moreover this problem is inti-
mately related to classical experimentation and estimation procedures.
In this chapter, we also consider the “full information” version of the prob-
lem, or what we call the online auction problem, where the valuations of the
buyers are revealed to the algorithm after the buyer has made a decision. Such
information may be available in a context where the buyers have to bid for the
items, and are awarded the item if their bid is above a hidden price. How should
an auction designer iteratively picks new auctions (or new hidden prices) if he
wishes to maximize his revenue? What if he also cares about market share?
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The objective of this chapter is to study the above problems through the
lens of online learning, but from a different perspective that we call multi-scale
online learning. In the multi-scale online learning framework, the objective is to
design learning algorithms that are scale-free, i.e. their performance does not
scale up with the range of rewards. We make bridges between this framework
and our online mechanism design problems. By the help of these connections,
we are able to find tight multi-scale regret bounds (which will be defined later
in this chapter) for different online mechanism design questions that we are
considering.
Organization of the chapter. In Section 5.1 we define the multi-scale online
learning framework, define the online auction and pricing problem, and review
the related literature for both of these topics. In Section 5.2 we summarize our
approach and techniques. In Section 5.3 we give detailed proofs of our results.
Finally, we conclude by summarizing the chapter and proposing some interest-
ing open problems in Section 5.4.
5.1 Preliminary
In this section, we give an overview of the two main problems we are solving in
this chapter, which are designing algorithms for online multi-scale learning, and
designing mechanisms for online auctions/pricing. We formally define these
two problems and the objectives we are pursuing in Section 5.1.1, and then lo-
cate our result in the related literature for this problem in Section 5.1.2.
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5.1.1 Problem Definition: Auctions and Multi-scale Learning
We consider a variety of online algorithmic problems that are all parts of the
multiscale online learning framework. We start by defining this framework and
mentioning action-specific regret bounds for this general problem. Achieving this
style of bounds for full-information (Arora et al., 2012) and bandit information
setting (Auer et al., 1995; Audibert and Bubeck, 2009) is one of the main goals
of this chapter. Next, we define different auction design problems that are cov-
ered by this framework. Here, the objective is to get multiplicative cum addi-
tive approximations for these problems 1 by the help of the multi-scale learning
framework.
Multi-scale online learning framework
Our multiscale online learning framework is basically the classical learning
from expert advice problem (under full-information) (Littlestone and Warmuth,
1994; Vovk, 1995; Arora et al., 2012) or multi-armed bandit problem (under
partial-information) (Auer et al., 1995). The main difference is that the range
of different experts/arms could be different. Suppose there is a set of actions A.
The problem proceeds in T rounds, and in each round t ∈ [T ] :2
• The algorithm picks an action it ∈ A
• The adversary picks a reward function g(t) simultaneously, where action i
has reward gi(t).
• The algorithm gets the reward git(t).
1Formally defined in Section 5.2.1.
2 We use the notation [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}, for any n ∈ N.
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• In the full information setting, the algorithm sees the entire reward function
g(t). In the bandit setting, the algorithm sees only its own reward, git(t).








We consider both full-information and the bandit setting:
• Multi-scale experts: The action set is countable. If the action set is finite
of size k, we identify A = [k]. The reward g(t) is such that for all i ∈ A,
gi(t) ∈ [0, ci]. The entire reward function g(t) is revealed to the algorithm
after round t.
• Multi-scale bandit learning: The same as before but in the bandit informa-
tion setting, i.e. only the reward of the action that has been picked by the
algorithm will be revealed.
The goal is to obtain action-specific regret bounds, which we call also multi-scale
regret guarantees. Towards this end, we define the following quantities.
Gi :=
∑
t∈[T ] gi(t) , (5.1)
REGRETi := Gi −GALG . (5.2)
Then, an action specific regret bound w.r.t. action i is an upper bound on
E [REGRETi] that only depends on the range ci, as well as any prior distribution




We investigate into the revenue maximization problem in online auctions and
pricing. In our setting a seller sells an identical item in each period to a new
buyer, or a new set of buyers, by running an auction or posting a price. Formally,
we consider the following online auction design problems.
• Online single buyer auction: The action set A = [1, h] 3. The reward func-
tion is such that the adversary picks a value v(t) ∈ [1, h] and for any price
i ∈ A, the reward gi(t) := p · 1(v(t) ≥ i). This is the full information setting,
where the value v(t) is revealed to the algorithm after round t.
• Online posted pricing: The same as above, in the bandit setting. The algo-
rithm only learns the indicator function 1(v(t) ≥ it) where it is the price it
picks in round t.
• Online multi buyer auction: The action set is the set of all “Myerson-type”
mechanisms for n buyers, for some n ∈ N. (See Definition 5.3.2.) The adver-
sary picks a valuation vector v(t) ∈ [1, h]n and the reward of a mechanism
M is its revenue when the valuation of the buyers is given by v(t); this is
denoted by REVM(v(t)). The algorithm sees the full vector of valuations
v(t).
By looking at the above problems as online learning problems, the technical
goal is to obtain multiplicative cum additive approximations for these problems
with GMAX as the benchmark, à la Blum et al. (2004); Blum and Hartline (2005).
The main improvement over these results that we are looking for in this chapter
is that the additive term scales with the best price rather than maximum range
3As will be clear later, we discretize this action set to be able to use our learning algorithms.
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h. Such a bound would be the auction version of the multi-scale style of regret
bounds we have discussed earlier.
5.1.2 Related Work
The online pricing problem, also called dynamic pricing, is a much studied topic,
across disciplines such as operations research and management science (Tal-
luri and Van Ryzin, 2006), economics (Segal, 2003), marketing, and of course
computer science. The multi-armed bandit approach to pricing is particularly
popular. See den Boer (2015) for a recent survey on various approaches to the
problem.
The online pricing problem has been studied from an online learning perspec-
tive, as a variant of the multi-armed bandit problem. The revenue of a pricing
algorithm is compared to the revenue of the best fixed posted price, in hind-
sight, and the difference between the two, called the regret, is analyzed. No as-
sumption is made on the distribution of values; the regret bounds are required
to hold for the worst case sequence of values. Blum et al. (2004) assume that
the buyer valuations are in [1, h], and show the following multiplicative-plus-
additive bound on the regret: for any  ∈ (0, 1), the regret is at most  times the
revenue of the optimal price, + O(−2h log h log log h). Blum and Hartline (2005)
show that the additive factor can be made to be O(−3h log log h), trading off a
log h factor for an extra −1 factor. Bar-Yossef et al. (2002), Blum et al. (2004), and
Blum and Hartline (2005) also consider the online auction problem, as a variant
of the best expert problem, in which they showed the additive part of the bound
is O(−1h log(−1)).
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Kleinberg and Leighton (2003) consider the online pricing problem, under
the assumption that the values are in [0, 1], and considered purely additive fac-
tors. They showed that the minimax additive regret is Θ˜(T 2/3), where T is the
number of periods. This is similar in spirit to regret bounds that scale with h,
since one has to normalize the values so that they are in [0, 1]. The finer distinc-
tion about the magnitude of the best fixed price is absent in this paper. Recently,
Syrgkanis (2017) also consider the online auction problem, with an emphasis
on a notion of “oracle based” computational efficiency. They assume the values
are all in [0, 1] and don’t consider the scaling issue that we do; this makes their
contribution orthogonal to ours.
Starting with Dhangwatnotai et al. (2014), there has been a spate of recent
results analyzing the sample complexity of pricing and auction problems. In this
category of problems, the designer receives i.i.d. samples from the buyer(s)
value distribution and the objective is to obtain (1 − )-approximation mecha-
nism for the optimal revenue by using as few samples as possible. Cole and
Roughgarden (2014) and Devanur et al. (2016) consider multiple buyer auctions
with regular distributions (with unbounded valuations) and give sample com-
plexity bounds that are polynomial in n and −1, where n is the number of buy-
ers. Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2015) consider arbitrary distributions with
values bounded by h, and gave bounds that are polynomial in n, h, and −1.
Roughgarden and Schrijvers (2016); Huang et al. (2015) give further improve-
ments on the single- and multi-buyer versions respectively; tables 5.1 and 5.2
give a summary of these results, for the problems we consider. The dynamic
pricing problem has also been studied when there are a given number of copies
of the item to sell (limited supply) (Agrawal and Devanur, 2014; Babaioff et al.,
2015a; Badanidiyuru et al., 2013a; Besbes and Zeevi, 2009). There are also vari-
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ants where the seller interacts with the same buyer repeatedly, and the buyer
can strategize to influence his utility in the future periods (Amin et al., 2013;
Devanur et al., 2014).
Foster et al. (2017) also consider the multi-scale online learning problem
motivated by a model selection problem. They consider additive bounds, for
the symmetric case, for full information, but not bandit feedback. Their regret
bounds are not comparable to ours in general; our bounds are better for the
pricing/auction applications we consider, and their bounds are better for their
application.
5.2 Our Approach in a Nutshell
An undesirable aspect of the bounds in Blum and Hartline (2005) is that they
scale linearly with h; this is particularly problematic when h is an estimate and
we might set it to be a generous upper bound on the range of prices we wish
to consider. A typical use case is when the same algorithm is used for many
different products, with widely varying price ranges. We may not be able to
manually tune the range for each product separately.
This dependency on h seems unavoidable, as is reflected by the lower
bounds for the problem. (Lower bounds are discussed later in the introduc-
tion.) Yet, somewhat surprisingly, our first contribution in this chapter is to
show that we can replace h by the best fixed price4 (that is used in the defi-
nition of the benchmark). In particular, we show that the additive bound can
4Standard bounds allow regret to depend on the loss of the best action instead of the worst
case loss. However, even such bounds still depend linearly on the range of the losses, and thus
they would not allow to replace h by the best fixed price.
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be made to be O(−2p∗ log h), where p∗ is the best fixed price in hindsight. This
allows us to use a very generous estimate for h; we only lose a log h factor. The
algorithm balances exploration probabilities of different prices carefully and au-
tomatically zooms in on the relevant price range. This does not violate known
lower bounds, since in those instances p∗ is close to h.
For the online auction problem, as mentioned earlier, Bar-Yossef et al. (2002),
Blum et al. (2004), and Blum and Hartline (2005) improved the additive term
to O(−1h log(−1)), which is tight. Once again, we show that h can be replaced
with p∗; in particular, we show that the additive term can be made to be
O(−1p∗ log(h−1)).
5.2.1 Purely multiplicative bounds and sample complexity
The regret bounds mentioned above can be turned into a purely multiplicative
factor in the following way: for any  > 0, the algorithm is guaranteed to get a
1−O() fraction of the best fixed price revenue, provided the number of periods
T ≥ E/, where E is the additive term in the regret bounds above. This follows
from the observation that a revenue of T is a lower bound on the best fixed
price revenue. Call the number of periods required to get a 1 −  multiplicative
approximation (as a function of ) as the convergence rate of the algorithm.
A 1 −  multiplicative factor is also the target in the recent line of work on
the sample complexity of auctions started by Dhangwatnotai et al. (2014); Cole
and Roughgarden (2014). (For a more comprehensive discussion of this line of
work refer to Section 5.1.2). Here, as mentioned earlier, i.i.d. samples of the
valuations are given from a fixed but unknown distribution, and the goal is to find
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a price such that its revenue w.r.t. the hidden distribution is a 1− fraction of the
optimum revenue for this distribution. The sample complexity is the minimum
number of samples needed to guarantee this (as a function of ).
The sample complexity and the convergence rate (for the full information
setting) are closely related to each other. The sample complexity is always
smaller than the convergence rate as the former is easier due to the following.
1. The valuations are i.i.d. in case of sample complexity whereas they can be
arbitrary (worst case) in case of convergence rate.
2. Sample complexity corresponds to an offline problem: you get all the sam-
ples at once. Convergence rate corresponds to an online problem: you
need to decide what to do on a given valuation without knowing what
valuations arrive in the future.
This is formalized in terms of an online to offline reduction [folklore] which shows
that a convergence rate upper bound can be automatically translated to a sample
complexity upper bound. This lets us convert sample complexity lower bounds
into lower bounds on the convergence rate, and in turn into lower bounds on
the additive error E in an additive plus multiplicative regret bound. For exam-
ple, the additive error for the online auction problem (and hence also for the
posted pricing problem5) cannot be o(h−1) (Huang et al., 2015). Moreover, it
is insightful to compare convergence rates we show with the best known sample
complexity upper bound; proving better convergence rates would mean improving these
bounds as well.
5 We conjecture that the lower bound for the posted pricing problem should be worse by a
factor of −1, since one needs to explore about −1 different prices.
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A natural target convergence rate for a problem is therefore the correspond-
ing sample complexity, but achieving this is not always trivial. An interesting
version of the sample complexity bound for auctions did not have an analogous
convergence rate bound. This version takes into account both revenue and market
share, and surprisingly, gets sample complexity bounds that are scale free; there
is no dependence on h, which means it works for unbounded valuations! For
any δ ∈ (0, 1), the best fixed price benchmark is relaxed to ignore those prices
whose market share (or equivalently probability of sale) is below a δ fraction;
as δ increases the benchmark is lower. This is a meaningful benchmark since
in many cases revenue is not the only goal, even if you are a monopolist. A
more reasonable goal is to maximize revenue subject to the constraint that the
market share is above a certain threshold. What is more, this gives a sample
complexity of O(−2δ−1 log(δ−1−1)) (Huang et al., 2015). In fact δ can be set to h−1
without loss of generality, when the values are in [1, h],6 and the above bound
then matches the sample complexity w.r.t. the best fixed price revenue. In ad-
dition, this bound gives a precise interpolation: as the target market share δ
increase, the number of samples needed decreases almost linearly.
The second contribution of this chapter is to show a convergence rate that
almost matches the above sample complexity, for the full information setting.
We have a mild dependence on h; the rate is proportional to log log h. Further,
we also show a near optimal convergence rate for the posted pricing problem.7
6 When the values are in [1, h], we can guarantee a revenue of T by posting a price of 1, and
to beat this, any other price (and in particular a price of h) would have to sell at least T/h times.
7 Unfortunately, we cannot yet guarantee that our online algorithm itself gets a market share
of δ, although we strongly believe that it does. Showing such bounds on the market share of the
algorithm is an important avenue for future research.
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Multiple buyers: All of our results in the full information (online auction) set-
ting extend to the multiple buyer model. In this model, in each time period, a
new set of n buyers competes for a single item. The seller runs a truthful auc-
tion that determines the winning buyer and his payment. The benchmark here
is the set of all “Myerson-type” mechanisms. These are mechanisms that are
optimal when each period has n buyers of potentially different types, and the
value of each buyer is drawn independently from a type dependent distribu-
tion. In fact, our convergence rates also imply new sample complexity bounds
for these problems (except that they are not computationally efficient).
The various bounds and comparison to previous work are summarized in
Tables 5.1 and 5.2. In Table 5.1 note that sample complexity is for the offline case
with i.i.d. samples from an unknown distribution. Convergence rate is for the
online case with a worst case sequence. Sample complexity is always no larger
than the convergence rate. Lower bounds hold for sample complexity too, ex-
cept for the online posted pricing problem for which there is no sample com-
plexity version. The additive-plus-multiplicative regret bounds are converted
to convergence rates by dividing the additive error by . In the last row, n is the
number of buyers. In the last column, p∗ denotes the optimal price.
5.2.2 Multi-scale online learning
The main technical ingredients in our results are variants of the classical prob-
lems of learning from expert advice and multi-armed bandit. We introduce
the multi-scale versions of these problems, where each action has its reward
bounded in a different range. Our third contribution is to give an algorithm
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Table 5.2: Sample complexity and convergence rate w.r.t. the optimal mecha-
nism/price with market share ≥ δ.
rewards for that particular action. To contrast, the regret bounds in the stan-
dard versions scale with the maximum range. We expect such bounds to be of
independent interest.
The multi-scale versions of these problems exhibit subtle variations that
don’t appear in the standard versions. First of all, our applications to auctions
and pricing have non-negative rewards, and this actually makes a difference.
For both the expert and the bandit versions, the minimax regret bounds for non-
negative rewards are provably better than those when rewards could be negative.
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Further, for the bandit version, we can prove a better bound if we only require
the bound to hold w.r.t. the best action, rather than all actions (for non-negative
rewards). The various regret bounds and comparison to standard bounds are
summarized in Table 5.3. In this table, note that non-negative rewards refers
to when the reward of any action i at any time is in [0, ci], and symmetric range
rewards refers to when the reward of any action i at any time is in [−ci, ci]. More-




Multi-scale bound (this chapter)
Upper bound O(·) Lower bound Ω(·)
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Tk log(k), i∗ is the best action -
Experts/symmetric cmax
√
T log(k) ∗ ci
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∗ Freund and Schapire (1995); † Audibert and Bubeck (2009).
Table 5.3: Pure-additive regret bounds for non-negative rewards and symmetric
range adversarial rewards.
We use algorithms based on online (stochastic) mirror descent (OSMD)
(Bubeck, 2011), with a weighted negative entropy as the Legendre function. This
framework gives regret bounds in terms of a “local norm” as well as an “initial
divergence”, which we then bound differently for each version of the problem.
In the technical sections we highlight how the subtle variations arise as a result
of different techniques used to bound these two terms.
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5.2.3 Main Results and Multi-scale Style Regret Bounds
Multi-scale regret bounds for online learning
The regret bound w.r.t. action i, i.e., an upper bound on E [REGRETi], depends
on the range ci, as well as any prior distribution pi over the action set A; this way,
we can handle countably many actions. Let cmin = infi∈A ci and cmax = supi∈A ci (if
applicable) be the minimum and the maximum range. We first state a version
of the regret bound which is parameterized by  > 0; such bounds are stronger
than
√
T type bounds which are more standard.
Theorem 5.2.1. There exists an algorithm for the multi-scale experts problem that takes
as input any distribution pi over A, the ranges ci, ∀ i ∈ A, and a parameter 0 <  ≤ 1,
and satisfies:
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Corollary 5.2.2. There exists an algorithm for the multi-scale experts problem that
takes as input the ranges ci, ∀ i ∈ A, and satisfies:







For the bandit version, we can get a similar regret guarantee, but only for
the best action. If we require the regret bound to hold for all actions, then we
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can only get a weaker bound, where the second term has −2 instead of −1. The
difference between the bounds for the bandit and the full information setting is
essentially a factor of k, which is unavoidable.
Theorem 5.2.3. There exists an algorithm for the online multi-scale bandits problem
that takes as input the ranges ci, ∀ i ∈ A, and a parameter 0 <  ≤ 1, and satisfies,
• for i∗ = argmaxi∈AGi,
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Also, one can compute the pure-additive versions of the bounds in Theo-
rems 5.2.3 by setting  =
√
k log(kT )




3 resepctively (Corollary 5.2.4),







sarial multi-armed bandit problem (Audibert and Bubeck, 2009).
Corollary 5.2.4. There exist algorithms for the online multi-scale bandits problem that
satisfies,
• For i∗ = argmaxi∈AGi,







• For all i ∈ A,
E [REGRETi] ≤ O
(




Multi-scale regret bounds for online auctions
We show how to get multiplicative cum additive approximations for these prob-
lems with GMAX as the benchmark, à la Blum et al. (2004); Blum and Hartline
(2005). The main improvement over these results is that the additive term scales
with the best price rather than h. Let p∗ be the best fixed price on hindsight,
which is the price that achieves GMAX.
Theorem 5.2.5. There are algorithms for the online single buyer auction, online posted
price auction, and the online multi buyer auction problems that take as input a param-






p∗ log h log(log h/)
2
, and
hn log h log(n log h/)
2
.
Even if h is not known up front, we can still get the similar approximation guarantee





hn log h log(n log h/)
2
.
Bounds on the sample complexity of auctions imply that the first bound in this
theorem is tight up to logarithmic factors: the lower bound is h−1 in an instance
where p∗ = h, and the best upper bound known is h−1 log(1/). We conjecture
that our bound for the online posted pricing problem is tight up to logarithmic
factors, and leave resolving this as an open problem. The third bound is not
comparable to the best sample complexity for the multi buyer auction problem
by Roughgarden and Schrijvers (2016); it is better than theirs for large  (when
1/ ≤ o(nh)), and is worse for smaller  (when 1/ ≥ ω(nh)). Also, compare these
to the corresponding upper bounds for the first two problems by Blum et al.
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Competing with δ-guarded benchmarks
For the single buyer auction/pricing problem, we define a δ-guarded bench-
mark, for any δ ∈ [0, 1]. This benchmark is restricted to only those prices that
sell the item in at least a δ fraction of the rounds.
GMAX(δ) := max
{∑T
t=1 gp(t) : p ∈ A,
∑T
t=1 1(vt ≥ p) ≥ δT
}
.
As observed in Footnote 6, one can replace δ with 1/h and get the correspond-
ing guarantees for GMAX rather than GMAX(δ). However, the main point of these
results is to show a graceful improvement of the bounds as δ is chosen to be
larger.
Multiple buyers: For the multi-buyer online auction problem, we define
the δ-guarded benchmark as follows. For any sequence of value vectors
v(1), v(2), . . . , v(T ), let V¯ denote the largest value such that there are at least δT








where the min is to be understood to be applied coordinate-wise, and the max is
over all Myerson-type mechanisms.
We focus on purely multiplicative approximation factors when competing
with OPT(δ). In particular, for any given  > 0, we are interested in a 1 − 
approximation. We state our results in terms of the convergence rate. We say that
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T (, δ) is the convergence rate of an algorithm if for all time horizon T ≥ T (, δ),
we are guaranteed that GALG ≥ (1 − )OPT(δ). Our main results are as follows.
Theorem 5.2.6. There are algorithms for the online single buyer auction, online posted





















Even if h is not known up front, we can still get the following similar convergence rates















Once again, we compare to the sample compexity bounds: our first is within
a log log h factor of the best sample complexity upper bound in Huang et al.
(2015). The lower bound for the online single buyer auction is Ω(δ−1−2), which
is also the best lower bound known for the pricing and the multi-buyer prob-
lem.8 For the online posted pricing problem, we conjecture that the right de-
pendence on  should be −3. No sample complexity bounds for the multi-buyer
problem were known before; in fact we introduce the definition of a δ-guarded
benchmark for this problem.
Multi-scale online learning with symmetric range
The standard analysis for the experts and the bandit problems holds even if the
range of gi(t) is [−ci, ci], rather than [0, ci] as we have assumed. In contrast, there
8 Cole and Roughgarden (2014) show that at least a linear dependence on n is necessary when
the values are drawn from a regular distribution, but as is, their lower bound needs unbounded
valuations. The lower bound probably holds for “large enough h” but it is not clear if it holds
for all h.
109
are subtle differences on the best acheivable multi-scale regret bounds between
the non-negative and the symmetric range. We first show the following upper
bound for the full information setting when the range is symmetric. This bound
follows the same style of action-specific regret bounds as in Theorem 5.2.1. More
detailed discussion on how the choice of initial distribution pi affects the bound
is deferred to the appendix, Section C.1.1.
Theorem 5.2.7. There exists an algorithm for the multi-scale experts problem with
symmetric range that takes as input any distribution pi over A, the ranges ci, ∀ i ∈ A,
and a parameter 0 <  ≤ 1, and satisfies:
∀i ∈ A : E [REGRETi] ≤  · E
[∑
t∈[T ]
∣∣∣gt(i)∣∣∣] + O(1 log ( 1pii · cicmin ) · ci
)
. (5.9)
Similar to Section 5.2.3, we can compute the pure-additive version of the
bound in Theorem 5.2.7 by setting  =
√
log(k· cmaxcmin )
T , as in Corollary 5.2.2.
Corollary 5.2.8. There exists an algorithm for the online multi-scale experts problem
with symmetric range that takes as input the ranges ci, ∀ i ∈ A, and satisfies:




T log(k · cmaxcmin )
)
(5.10)
If we compare the above regret bound with the standard O(cmax
√
T log k) re-
gret bound for the experts problem, we see that we replace the dependency
on cmax in the standard bound with ci
√
log( cmaxcmin ). It is natural to ask whether
we could get rid of the dependence on log(ci/cmin) and show a regret bound of
O(ci
√
T log k), like we did for non-negative rewards. However, the next theorem
shows that this dependence on log(ci/cmin) in the above bound is necessary, in a
weak sense: where the constant in the O(·) is universal and does not depend on
the ranges ci. This is because the lower bound only holds for “small” values of
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the horizon T , which nonetheless grows with the {ci}s.9
Theorem 5.2.9. There exists an action set of size k, and ranges ci,∀i ∈ [k], and time
horizon T , such that for all algorithms for the online multi-scale experts problem with
symmetric range, there is a sequence of T gain vectors such that
∃i ∈ A : E [REGRETi] > ci4 ·
√
T log(k · cmaxcmin )
We then show the following upper bound for the bandit setting when the
range is symmetric. This bound also follows the same style of action-specific
regret bounds as in Theorem 5.2.3.
Theorem 5.2.10. There exists an algorithm for the multi-scale bandits problem with
symmetric range that takes as input the ranges ci, ∀ i ∈ A, and a parameter 0 <  ≤ 1/2,
and satisfies:














Also, similar to Section 5.2.3, we can compute the pure-additive version
of the regret bound in Theorem 5.2.10 by setting  =
√




T , as in
Corollary 5.2.2. This bound is comparable to the standard regret bound of
O(cmax
√
kT ) (Audibert and Bubeck, 2009) for the adversarial multi-armed ban-
dits problem.
Corollary 5.2.11. There exists an algorithm for the online multi-scale bandits problem
with symmetric range that satisfies:




Tk · cmaxcmin log(kT · cmaxcmin )
)
. (5.12)
9For this reason we chose not to include this bound in Table 5.3.
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Once again, for the bandit problem, the following theorem shows that this
bound cannot be improved beyond logarithmic factors (to get a guarantee like
that of Theorem 5.2.3, for instance).
Theorem 5.2.12. There exists an action set of size k, and ranges ci,∀i ∈ [k], such that
for all algorithms for the online multi-scale bandit problem with symmetric range, for
all sufficiently large time horizon T , there is a sequence of T gain vectors such that









5.2.4 Organization of the Technical Parts
We start in Section 5.3.1 by showing regret upper bounds for the multi-scale ex-
perts problem with non-negative rewards (Theorem 5.2.1). The corresponding
upper bounds for the bandit version are in section 5.3.2 (Theorem 5.2.3). In Sec-
tion 5.3.3 we show how the multi-scale regret bounds (Theorems 5.2.1 and 5.2.3)
imply the corresponding bounds for the auction/pricing problems (Theorems
5.2.5 and 5.2.6). Finally, the regret (upper and lower) bounds for the symmetric
range are discussed in Section 5.3.4 (Theorems 5.2.7, 5.2.9, 5.2.10, and 5.2.12).
5.3 Detailed Results: How to Get Multi-scale Regret Bounds
In this section, we discuss the details and required proofs of our results in this
chapter. We first consider the full-information expert setting for multi-scale
learning, and then we continue by considering the bandit problem. We then
switch gears to the auction and pricing problems, where we use the bounds
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we developed for multi-scale learning to obtain near-optimal regret bounds for
various online auction and pricing problems. We finally discuss the multi-scale
online learning framework under the symmetric range assumption.
5.3.1 Multi-Scale Online Learning with Full Information
In this section, we look at the full information multi-scale learning problem,
in which different experts have different ranges. We exploit this structure to
achieve expert-specific regret bounds.
Here is a map of this section. We propose an algorithm that exploits the
aforementioned structure, and later we show how this algorithm is an on-
line mirror descent with weighted negative entropy as the Legendre function.
For reward-only instances, we prove the regret bound without dependency on
log(ci/cmax).
Multi-Scale Multiplicative-Weight (MSMW) algorithm
We propose the “Multi-Scale Multiplicative-Weight” (MSMW) algorithm as a
multiplicative-weight update style learning algorithm for our problem. The al-
gorithm is presented in Algorithm 5. The main idea behind this algorithm is
taking into account different ranges for different experts, and therefore
1. normalizing the reward of each expert accordingly, i.e. dividing the re-
ward of expert i by ci;
2. projecting the updated weights accordingly, by performing a smooth multi-
scale projection into the simplex that will be described later.
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Algorithm 5: MSMW
1: input initial distribution µ over A, learning rate 0 < η ≤ 1.
2: initialize p(1) such that pi(1) = µi for all i ∈ A.
3: for t = 1, . . . ,T do
4: Randomly pick an action drawn from p(t), and observe g(t).
5: ∀i ∈ A : wi(t + 1)← pi(t) · exp(η · gi(t)ci ).
6: Find λ∗ (e.g., binary search) s.t.
∑
i∈A wi(t + 1) · exp(−λ∗ci ) = 1.
7: ∀i ∈ A : pi(t + 1)← wi(t + 1) · exp(−λ∗ci ).
8: end for
Equivalence to Mirror Descent (OMD)
While it is possible to analyze the regret of the MSMW algorithm (Algorithm 5)
by using first principles (analogous to the proof of Lemma 5.3.3 in the appendix,
Section C.1.4), we take a different approach. We show how this algorithm is in-
deed an instance of the Online Mirror Descent (OMD) algorithm for a particular
choice of Legendre function.
MSMW algorithm as an OMD. For our application, we focus on a particular
choice of Legendre function that captures different learning rates proportional
to c−1i for different experts, as we saw earlier in Algorithm 5. We start by defining
the weighted negative entropy function.




i∈A ci · xi ln(xi) (5.13)
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Lemma 5.3.1. F(x) =
∑
i∈A ci · xi ln(xi) is a non-negative Legendre function over RA+.
Moreover, ∇F(x)i = ci(1 + ln(xi)) and DF(x, y) = ∑i∈A ci · (xi ln( xiyi ) − xi + yi).
We now have the following lemma that shows Algorithm 5 is indeed an
OMD algorithm.
Lemma 5.3.2. The MSMW algorithm, i.e. Algorithm 5, is equivalent to an OMD
algorithm associated with the weighted negative entropy F(x) =
∑
i∈A ci · xi ln(xi) as its
Legendre function.
Proof. Look at the gradient update step of OMD, as in Equation (2.9), with Leg-
endre transform F(x) =
∑
i∈A ci · xi ln(xi). By using Corollary 5.3.1 we have
∇F(w(t + 1)) = ∇F(p(t)) + η · g(t)⇒ ci(1 + ln(wi(t + 1))) = ci(1 + ln(pi(t))) + η · gi(t) ,
and therefore, wi(t + 1) = pi(t) · exp(η · gi(t)ci ). Moreover, for the Bregman projection
step we have









ci · (pi ln( piwi(t + 1)) − pi + wi(t + 1))
 (5.14)
This optimization problem is indeed a convex minimization over a convex set.
To find a closed form solution, we look at the Lagrangian dual functionL(p, λ) ,∑
i∈A ci · (pi ln( piwi(t+1) ) − pi + wi(t + 1)) + λ(
∑
i∈A pi − 1) and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) conditions ∇L(p∗, λ∗) = 0. We have










i∈A p∗i = 1, λ
∗ should be unique number s.t.
∑
i∈A wi(t + 1) · exp(−λ∗ci ) = 1, and
then pi(t + 1) = wi(t + 1) · exp(−λ∗ci ). So, Algorithm 5 is equivalent to OMD with
weighted negative entropy as its Legendre function. 
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We now have the following lemma, whose proof is provided in the Ap-
pendix C.1.4. Also, this lemma can derived directly by combining Lemma 5.3.2,
Lemma 5.3.1 and Lemma 2.4.1.
Lemma 5.3.3. For any initial distribution µ over A, and any learning rate parameter
0 < η ≤ 1, and any benchmark distribution q over A, the MSMW algorithm satisfies
that:∑
i∈A



















− qi + µi
)
.
Regret bound for non-negative rewards - proof of Theorem 5.2.1
Proof of Theorem 5.2.1. Suppose imin is an action with the minimum ci. Let µ =
(1 − η) · 1imin + η · pi, and let q = (1 − η) · 1i + η · pi in Lemma 5.3.3. If i , imin, we get
that (note that µ j = q j for any j , i, imin):
(1 − η) ·Gi + η ·
∑
j∈A



















− qimin + µimin
)



































Finally, note that G j ≥ 0 for all j ∈ A in reward-only instances. So the LHS is
lower bounded by
(1 − η) ·Gi − E [GALG] = (1 − η) · REGRETi − η · E [GALG] .
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Putting together we get that























The theorem then follows by choosing η = 3 and rearranging terms. 
5.3.2 Multi-Scale Online Learning with Bandit Feedback
In this section, we look at the bandit feedback version of multi-scale online
learning. Inspired by the online stochastic mirror descent algorithm, we in-
troduce Bandit-MSMW algorithm. Our algorithm follows the standard bandit
route of using unbiased estimators for the rewards in a full information strat-
egy (in this case MSMW). We also mix the MSMW distribution with an extra
uniform exploration, and use a tailored initial distribution for our multi-scale
learning setting.
Here is a map of this section. We propose our bandit algorithm and prove its
general regret guarantee for non-negative rewards. Then we show how to get
a multi-scale style regret guarantee for the best arm ci∗ , and a weaker guarantee
for all arms {ci}iA.
Bandit-MSMW algorithm
We present our Bandit algorithm (Algorithm 6) when the set of actions A is finite
(with |A| = k). Let η be the learning rate and γ be the exploration probability. We
show the following regret bound.
Lemma 5.3.4. For any exploration probability 0 < γ ≤ 12 and any learning rate param-
eter 0 < η ≤ γk , the Bandit-MSMW algorithm achieves the following regret bound when
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Algorithm 6: Bandit-MSMW
1: input exploration parameter γ > 0, learning rate η > 0.
2: initialize p(1) = (1 − γ)1imin + γk1, where imin is the arm with min range cimin .
3: for t = 1, . . . ,T do
4: Let p˜(t) = (1 − γ)p(t) + γk1.
5: Randomly pick an expert it drawn from p˜(t), and observe git(t).





if i = it;
0 otherwise.
7: ∀i ∈ A : wi(t + 1)← pi(t) · exp( ηci · g˜i(t)).
8: Find λ∗ (e.g., binary search) s.t.
∑
i∈A wi(t + 1) · exp(−λ∗ci ) = 1.
9: ∀i ∈ A : pi(t + 1)← wi(t + 1) · exp(−λ∗ci ).
10: end for
the gains are non-negative :









· ci + η∑ j∈AG j + γ ·Gi)
Proof. We further define:
G˜ALG ,
∑
t∈[T ] git(t) =
∑
t∈[T ] p˜(t) · g˜(t) ,
G˜ j ,
∑
t∈[T ] g˜ j(t) .















for any j ∈ A.












≥ (1 − γ)∑t∈[T ] p(t) · g˜(t) .
Hence, we have that for any initial distribution q over A:
∑
j∈A










j∈A q j · G˜ j −∑t∈[T ] p(t) · g˜(t)] + γ1−γE [G˜ALG]
≤ E
[∑
j∈A q j · G˜ j −∑t∈[T ] p(t) · g˜(t)] + 2γE [G˜ALG] . (5.16)
Next, we upper bound the 1st term on the RHS. Note that p(t)’s are the prob-
abilities of choosing experts by MSMW when the experts have rewards g˜(t)’s.
By Lemma 5.3.3, we have that for any benchmark distribution q over S , the























q j ln ( q jp j(1)) − q j + p j(1)
 .
(5.17)
For any t ∈ [T ] and any j ∈ A, by the definition of g˜ j(t), it equals g j(t)p˜ j(t) with
probability p˜ j(t), and equals 0 otherwise. Thus, if we fix the random coin flips in
the first t−1 rounds and, thus, fix p˜(t), and take expectation over the randomness
in round t, we have that:
E
 p j(t)c j · (g˜ j(t))2
 = p j(t)c j · p˜ j(t) ·
g j(t)p˜ j(t)





Further note that since p˜ j(t) ≥ (1 − γ)p j(t), and g j(t) ≤ c j, the above is upper
bounded by 11−γg j(t) ≤ 2g j(t). Putting together with (5.17), we have that for any





























q j ln ( q jp j(1)) − q j + p j(1)





















q j ln ( q jp j(1)) − q j + p j(1)
+2γE [G˜ALG]
Let q = (1 − γ)1i + γk1. Recall that p(1) = (1 − γ)1imin + γk1 (recall imin is the
arm with minimum range cimin). Similar to the discussion for the expert problem




































































The lemma then follows by putting it back to (5.18) and rearranging terms.

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Regret for non-negative rewards - proof of Theorem 5.2.3
Proof of Theorem 5.2.3. Letting γ =  and η = γk =

k in Lemma 5.3.4, we get that
the expected regret w.r.t. an action i ∈ A is bounded by:
O
(
 ·Gi + k
∑






When i = i∗ (best arm), regret is bounded by O
(







For the regret w.r.t. an arbitrary action, note that E
[
GALG
] ≥ γk ∑ j∈AG j. Thus,


























5.3.3 Auctions and Pricing
Auctions and pricing as multi-scale learning problems
Online single buyer auction and posted pricing Recall that in each round, the
algorithm chooses an action, i.e., a price, pt ∈ [1, h]; the adversary picks a value
v(t) ∈ [1, h]; and the algorithm collects reward gpt(t) = pt · 1(v(t) ≥ pt). In order to
obtain a 1− approximation of the optimal revenue, it suffices to consider prices
of the form (1 + ) j for 0 ≤ j ≤ blog1+ hc = O( log h ). As a result, we reduce the
online single buyer auction problem and the online posted pricing problem to a
multi-scale online learning problem with full information and bandit feedback
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respectively with k = O( log h

) actions whose ranges form a geometric sequence
(1 + ) j, 0 ≤ j < k.
Online multi buyer auction In multi buyer auctions, we consider the set of
all discretized Myerson-type auctions as the action space. We start by defining
Myerson-type auctions:
Definition 5.3.2 (Myerson-type auctions). A Myerson-type auction is defined by
n non-decreasing virtual value mappings φ1, . . . , φn : [1, h] 7→ [−∞, h]. Given a
value profile v1, . . . , vn, the item is given to the bidder j with the largest non-
negative virtual value φ j(v j). Then, bidder j pays the minimum value that
would keep him as the the winner.
Myerson (1981) shows that when the bidders’ values are drawn from inde-
pendent (but not necessarily identical) distributions, the revenue-optimal auc-
tion is a Myerson-type auction. Devanur et al. (2016, Lemma 5) observe that
to obtain a 1 −  approximation, it suffices to consider the set of discretized
Myerson-type auctions that treat each bidder’s value as if it is equal to the clos-
est power of 1 +  from below. As a result, it suffices to consider the set of
discretized Myerson-type auctions, each of which is defined by the virtual val-
ues of (1 + ) j’s, i.e., by O(n log h/) real numbers φ`((1 + ) j), for ` ∈ [n], and
0 ≤ j ≤ blog1+ hc. Devanur et al. (2016); Gonczarowski and Nisan (2017) fur-
ther note that a discretized Myerson-type auction is in fact completely charac-
terized by the total ordering of φ`((1 + ) j)’s; their actual values do not matter.
Indeed, both the allocation rule and the payment rule are determined by the or-
dering of virtual values. As a result, our action space is a finite set with at most
O((n log h/)!) actions. The range of an action, i.e., a discretized Myerson-type
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auction, is the largest price ever charged by the auction, i.e., the largest value v
of the form (1 + ) j such that there exists ` ∈ [n], φ`(v) > φ`((1 + )−1v).
Proof of Theorem 5.2.5
Proof. Online single buyer auction. Recall the above formulation of the problem
as an online learning problem with full information. The case when h is known
then follows by Theorem 5.2.1, letting pi be the uniform distribution over the
k = O(log h/) actions, i.e., discretized prices.
When h is not known up front, we consider a countably infinite action space
comprising of all prices of the form (1 + ) j, for j ≥ 0. Then, let the prior distri-
bution pi be such that for any price p = (1 + ) j, pip = (1 + )− j−1 = 1+ · 1p . The
approximation guarantee then follows by Theorem 5.2.1.
Online posted pricing. Recall the above formulation of the problem as an
online learning problem with bandit feedback. This part then follows by Theo-
rem 5.2.3 with k = O(log h/) actions.
Online multi buyer auction. Recall the above formulation of the problem as
an online learning problem with full information. The case when h is known
then follows by Theorem 5.2.1, where we let pi be the uniform distribution over
the k = O((n log h/)!) actions, i.e., Myerson-type auctions.
When h is not known up front, we consider a countably infinite action space
A as follows. For any p = (1 + ) j, j ≥ 0, let the kp = O((n log p/)!) Myerson-type
auctions for values in [1, p] be in A; we assume these auctions treat any values
greater than p as if they were p. Further, we choose the prior distribution pi such
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that the probability mass of each auction for range [1, p] is equal to 1+ · 1p · 1kp .
The approximation guarantee then follows by Theorem 5.2.1. 
Proof of Theorem 5.2.6
Proof. Online single buyer auction. When h is known, by Theorem 5.2.1, letting
pi be the uniform distribution over the k = O(log h/) actions, i.e., discretized
prices, we have that for any price p (recall that cp = p):







For the δ-guarded optimal price p∗ (i.e., subject to selling in at least δT rounds),




, the additive term
of the above approximation guarantee is at most  ·Gp∗ . So the theorem holds.
The treatment for the case when h is not known up front is essentially the
same as in Theorem 5.2.5. We consider a countably infinite action space com-
prised of all prices of the form (1 + ) j, for j ≥ 0. Then, let the prior distribution
pi be such that for any price p = (1 + ) j, pip = (1 + )− j−1 = 1+ · 1p .
Online posted pricing. Recall the above formulation of the problem as an
online learning problem with bandit feedback. By Theorem 5.2.3 with k =
O(log h/) actions, we have that for any price p:
ALG ≥ (1 − ) ·Gp − O
(





Again, for the δ-guarded optimal price p∗ (i.e., subject to selling in at least δT









the additive term of the above approximation guarantee is at most  ·Gp∗ . So the
theorem holds.
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Online multi buyer auction. Suppose i∗ is the δ-guarded best Myerson-type
auction. Recall that V¯ is the largest value such that there are at least δT distinct
v(t)’s with max`∈[n] v`(t) ≥ V¯ . So we may assume without loss of generality that i∗
does not distinguish values greater than V¯ . Hence:
ci∗ ≤ V¯ . (5.19)
Further, note that running a second-price auction with anonymous reserve
V¯ is a Myerson-type auction (e.g., mapping values less than V¯ to virtual value
−∞ and values greater than or equal to V¯ to virtual value V¯), and it gets revenue
at least δT · V¯ . So we have that:
Gp∗ ≥ δT · V¯ . (5.20)
Finally, the above implies that to obtain a 1 −  approximation, it suffices to
consider prices that are at least δV¯ . Hence, it suffices to consider Myerson-type
auctions that, for a given V¯ , do not distinguish among values greater than V¯ , and
do not distinguish among values smaller than δV¯ . There are O(log h/) different
values of V¯ . Further, given V¯ , there are only O(log(1/δ)/) distinct values to be
considered and, thus, there are at most O((n log(1/δ)/)!) distinct Myerson-type
auctions of this kind. Hence, the total number of distinct Myerson-type actions











When h is known, letting pi be the uniform distribution over the k actions in
Theorem 5.2.1, we have that (recall Eqn. (5.19)):
ALG≥(1 − ) ·Gi∗ − O
(








When T ≥ O
(






, the additive term of the above
approximation guarantee is at most  · Gi∗ due to Eqn. (5.20). So the theorem
holds.
Again, the treatment for the case when h is not known up front is similar to
that in Theorem 5.2.5. When h is not known up front, we consider a countably
infinite action space A as follows. For any V¯ = (1 + ) j, j ≥ 0, let the k′ =
O((n log(1/δ)/)!) Myerson-type auctions that do not distinguish among values
greater than V¯ , and do not distinguish among values smaller than δV¯ be in
A. Further, we choose the prior distribution pi such that the probability mass of
each Myerson-type auction for a given V¯ is equal to 1+ · 1V¯ · 1k′ . The approximation
guarantee then follows by Theorem 5.2.1 and essentially the same argument as
the known h case. 
Remark Devanur et al. (2016) show that when the values are drawn from in-
dependent regular distributions, the -guarded optimal benchmark is a 1 − 
approximation of the unguarded optimal benchmark. So our convergence rate
for the online multi buyer auction problem in Theorem 5.2.1 implies a O˜(n−4)
sample complexity modulo a mild log log h dependency on the range, almost
matching the best known sample complexity upper bound for regular distribu-
tions.
5.3.4 Multi-scale Online Learning with Symmetric Range
In this section, we consider multi-scale online learning when the rewards are
in a symmetric range, i.e. for all i ∈ A and t ∈ [T ], gi(t) ∈ [−ci, ci]. We look at
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both full information and bandit settings, and prove action-specific regret upper
bounds. We defer the regret lower bound proofs to the appendix, Sections C.1.2
and C.1.3.
Multi-scale expert problem with symmetric range
Recall the proof of Lemma 5.3.3. The proof only requires gi(t) ∈ [−ci, ci] for all
i ∈ A, t ∈ [T ]. Choosing q to be 1i, a vector with a 1-entry in ith coordinate and







≤ ∑t∈[T ] ∑i∈A pi(t) · ∣∣∣gi(t)∣∣∣ ,
we get the following regret bound as a corollary of Lemma 5.3.3.
Corollary 5.3.5. For any initial distribution µ over A, and any learning rate parameter
0 < η ≤ 1, the MSMW algorithm achieves the following regret bound:
∀i ∈ A : E [REGRETi] ≤ η · E
[∑
t∈[T ]
∣∣∣gi(t)∣∣∣] + 1ηci · log ( 1µi ) + 1η ∑ j∈A µ jc j (5.21)
Now, we can prove the multi-scale regret upper bound in Theorem 5.2.7
using Corollary 5.3.5.
Proof of Theorem 5.2.7. The proof follows by choosing an appropriate initial dis-
tribution µ in Corollary 5.3.5. By Corollary 5.3.5, we have:
E [REGRETi] ≤ η · E
[∑
t∈[T ]
∣∣∣gi(t)∣∣∣] + 1ηci · log( 1µi ) + 1η ∑ j∈A µ jc j
Let imin be an action with the minimum range cimin = cmin. Consider an initial
distribution µ j = pi j cminc j for all j , imin, and µimin = 1 −
∑
j,imin µ j, i.e., putting all
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remaining probability mass on action imin. Then, the third term on the RHS is
upper bounded by:
∑
j∈A µ jc j =
∑
j,imin µ jc j + µimincimin =
∑
j,imin pi jcmin + µimincmin ≤ 2cmin ≤ 2ci .
For i , imin, by the definition of µi, we have:
E [REGRETi] ≤ η · E
[∑
t∈[T ]
∣∣∣gi(t)∣∣∣] + 1ηci · log( 1pii · cicmin ) + 1η · 2cmin
= η · E
[∑
t∈[T ]
∣∣∣gi(t)∣∣∣] + O( 1η log ( 1pii · cicmin ) · ci
)
.
So the theorem follows by choosing η = . For i = imin, note that µ j ≤ pi j for all
j , imin and, thus, µimin = 1−
∑
j,imin µ j ≥ 1−
∑




then holds following the same calculation as in the j , imin case. 
5.3.5 Multi-scale Bandit Problem with Symmetric Range
We start by presenting the following regret bound, whose proof is an alteration
of that for Lemma 5.3.4 under symmetric range (and is deferred to the appendix,
Section C.1.6). Next, we prove Theorem 5.2.10.
Lemma 5.3.6. For any exploration rate 0 < γ ≤ min{ 12 , cmincmax } and any learning rate
0 < η ≤ γk , the Bandit-MSMW algorithm (Algorithm 6) achieves the following regret
bound:








· ci + γT · cmax
)
Proof of Theorem 5.2.10. Let γ =  cmincmax and η =
γ
k in Lemma 5.3.6. Theorem follows
noting that γcmax = cmin ≤ ci. 
128
5.4 Conclusion
We conclude the chapter by summarizing our contributions. We considered
revenue maximization in online auctions and pricing. A seller sells an identical
item in each period to a new buyer, or a new set of buyers. For the online posted
pricing problem, we showed regret bounds that scale with the best fixed price,
rather than the range of the values. We also showed regret bounds that are
almost scale free, and match the offline sample complexity, when comparing to
a benchmark that requires a lower bound on the market share. These results
were obtained by generalizing the classical learning from experts and multi-
armed bandit problems to their multi-scale versions. In this version, the reward
of each action is in a different range, and the regret w.r.t. a given action scales
with its own range, rather than the maximum range.
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APPENDIX A
OMITTED PROOFS AND DISCUSSIONS FROM CHAPTER 3
A.1 Implicit Payment Computation
In this section we describe one standard reduction for computing implicit pay-
ments in our general setting, given access to a BIC allocation algorithm A˜:
a multi-parameter counterpart of the single-parameter payment computation
procedure used for example by Archer et al. (2004); Hartline and Lucier (2010),
which makes n + 1 calls to A˜, thus incurring a factor n + 1 overhead in run-
ning time. A different implicit payment computation procedure, described
in Babaioff et al. (2013, 2015b), avoids this overhead by calling A˜ only once
in expectation, but incurs a 1 −  loss in expected welfare and potentially makes
payments of magnitude Θ(1/) from the mechanism to the agents.
The implicit payment computation procedure assumes that the agents’ type
spaces (T k)k∈[n] are star-convex at 0, meaning that for any agent k, any type tk ∈ T k,
and any scalar λ ∈ [0, 1], there is another type λtk ∈ T k with the property that
v(λtk, o) = λv(tk, o) for every o ∈ O. (The assumption is without loss of generality,
as argued in the next paragraph.) The implicit payment computation procedure,
applied to type profile t, samples λ ∈ [0, 1] uniformly at random and computes
outcomes o0 , A˜(t) as well as ok , A˜(λtk, t−k) for all k ∈ [n]. The payment charged
to agent k is v(tk, o0) − v(tk, ok). Note that, in expectation, agent k pays
pk(t) = v(tk, A˜(t)) −
∫ 1
0
v(tk, A˜(λtk, t−k)) dλ,
in accordance with the payment identity for multi-parameter BIC mechanisms
when type spaces are star-convex at 0; see Babaioff et al. (2013) for a discussion
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of this payment identity.
Finally, let us justify the assumption that T k is star-convex for all k. This as-
sumption is without loss of generality for the allocation algorithms A˜ that arise
from the RSM reduction, because we can enlarge the type space T k if necessary
by adjoining types of the form λtk with tk ∈ T k and 0 ≤ λ < 1. Although the out-
put of the original allocation algorithmAmay be undefined when its input type
profile includes one of these artifically-adjoined types, the RSM reduction never
inputs such a type intoA. It only callsA on profiles of surrogate types sampled
from the type-profile distribution F , whose support excludes the artificially-
adjoined types. Thus, even when the input to A˜ includes an artifically-adjoined
type λtk, it occurs as one of the replicas in the reduction. The behavior of algo-
rithm A˜ remains well-defined in this case, because replicas are only used as in-
puts to the valuation function v(ri, o j), whose output is well-defined even when
ri = λtk for λ < 1.
A.2 Surrogate Selection and BIC Reduction
Lemma A.2.1. If matching algorithm M(r, s) produces a perfect k-to-1 matching for the
instance in Definition 3.3.5, then its corresponding surrogate selection rule, denoted by
ΓM, is stationary
Proof. Each surrogate s j is an i.i.d. sample from F . Moreover, by the principle
of deferred decisions the index i∗ (the real agent’s index in the replica type pro-
file) is a uniform random index in [mk], even after fixing the matching. Since
this choice of replica is uniform in [mk] and M is a perfect k-to-1 matching, the
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selection of surrogate outcome is uniform in [m], and therefore the selection of
surrogate type associated with this outcome is also uniform in [m]. As a result,
the output distribution of the selected surrogate type is F . 
Lemma A.2.2. If M(r, s) is a feasible replica-surrogate k-to-1 matching and is a truth-
ful allocation rule (in expectation over allocation’s random coins) for all replicas (i.e.
assuming each replica is a rational agent, no replica has any incentive to misreport),
then the composition of ΓM and interim allocation algorithm A(.) forms a BIC alloca-
tion algorithm for the original mechanism design problem.
Proof. Each replica-agent i ∈ [mk] (including the real agent i∗) bests off by report-
ing her true replica type under some proper payments. Now, consider an agent
in the original mechanism design problem with true type t. For any given surro-
gate type profile s, using the ΓM-reduction the agent receives the same outcome
distribution as the one he gets matched to in M in a Bayesian sense, simply be-
cause of stationary property of ΓM (Lemma A.2.1). As allocation M is incentive
compatible, this agent doesn’t benefit from miss-reporting her true type as long
as the value he receives for reporting t′ is v(t,A(ΓM(t′))). Therefore conditioning
on s and non-real replicas in r, the final allocation is BIC from the perspective of
this agent. The lemma then follows by averaging over the random choice of s
and non-real agent replicas in r. 
A.3 Estimating the Offline Optimal Regularized Matching
To formalize the approximation scheme, first fix the surrogate type profile






and vˆi, j(ri) be the empirical mean of N samples of the random vari-
able v(ri,A(s j). Suppose v(r) and vˆ(r) be the corresponding vectors of expected
values and empirical means under replica profile r. Now, draw r′ indepen-
dently at random from the distribution of r. We now show that OPT(vˆ(r′)) is a
constant-factor approximation to OPT(v(r)) with high probability, and therefore
we can use OPT(vˆ(r′)) to set γ.
We prove this in two steps. In Lemma A.3.1 we show for a given r′,
OPT(vˆ(r′)) is a constant-factor approximation to OPT(v(r′)) with high probabil-
ity over the randomness in {A(s j)}. Then, in Lemma A.3.3 we show if r and r′
are two random independent draws from the replica profile distribution then
OPT(v(r′)) is a constant-factor approximation to OPT(v(r)) with high probability
over randomness in r and r′. These two pieces together prove our claim.
Lemma A.3.1. If N ≥ 2 log(4m2k·η−1)
δ2(logm)2 , then 1/2 · OPT(v(r′)) ≤ OPT(vˆ(r′)) ≤ 2OPT(v(r′))
with probability at least 1 − η/2.
Proof. By using the standard Chernoff-Hoeffding bound together with the
union bound, with probability at least 1 − 2m2ke− δ2(logm)2 ·N2 ≥ 1 − η/2 we have
∀(i, j) ∈ [km] × [m] : |vˆi, j(r′i ) − vi, j(r′i )| ≤ 1/2 · δ logm
Suppose x∗ is the optimal solution of the regularized matching convex program






















= OPT(v(r′)) − δkm logm
2
≥ 1/2 · OPT(v(r′))
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where the last inequality holds as OPT(v(r′)) is bounded below by the value of
the uniform allocation, i.e. OPT(v(r′)) ≥ δ · mk log(m). Similarly, one can show
OPT(v(r′)) ≥ 1/2 · OPT(vˆ(r′)), which completes the proof. 
Before proving the second step, we prove the following lemma, which ba-
sically shows that the optimal value of regularized matching OPT(v(·)) is a 1-
Lipschitz multivariate function.
Lemma A.3.2. For every i ∈ [km], replica profile r, and replica type r′i we have:
|OPT(v(ri, r−i)) − OPT(v(r′i , r−i))| ≤ 1
Proof. Let variables x and x′ denote the optimal assignments in OPT(v(ri, r−i))




(xl · vl(rl) + δH(xl)) ≥
∑
l,i




(x′l · vl(rl) + δH(x′l)) + x′i · vi(r′i ) + δH(x′i) − 1 = OPT(v(r′i , r−i)) − 1
where the last inequality holds because x′i · (vi(r′i ) − vi(ri)) ≤ 1. Similarly,
OPT(v(r′i , r−i)) ≥ OPT(v(ri, r−i)) − 1 by switching the roles of ri and r′i . 
Lemma A.3.3. If k ≥ 32 log(8η−1)
δ2m(logm)2 , then 1/2 · OPT(v(r)) ≤ OPT(v(r′)) ≤ 3/2 · OPT(v(r))
with probability at least 1 − η/2.
Proof. We start by defining the following Doob martingale sequence (Motwani
and Raghavan, 2010), where (conditional) expectations are taken over the ran-







OPT(v(r))|r1, · · · , rn] , n = 1, 2, . . . , km
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It is easy to check that E
[
Xn|r1, . . . , rn−1] = Xn−1, and therefore {Xn} forms a mar-
tingale sequence with respect to {rn}. Moreover, |Xn − Xn−1| ≤ 1 because of
Lemma A.3.2. Now, by using Azuma–Hoeffding bound for martingales, we
have
Pr
{|Xkm − X0| ≥ δkm log(m)/4} ≤ 2e −kmδ2(logm)232
and thus with probability at least 1 − 2e −kmδ2(logm)232 , |OPT(v(r)) − E[OPT(v(r))]| ≤
δkm log(m)
4 . Similarly, with probability at least 1 − 2e
−kmδ2(logm)2




]| ≤ δkm log(m)4 . Note that OPT(v(r)) and OPT(v(r′)) are identically dis-
tributed, and in particular they have the same expectation. Therefore with prob-
ability at least 1−4e −kmδ2(logm)232 we have |OPT(v(r))−OPT(v(r′))| ≤ δkm log(m)2 . By using
the lower bound of δkm log(m) for OPT(v(r)) (due to uniform assignment), we
conclude that with probability at least 1 − 4e −kmδ2(logm)232 ≥ 1 − η/2 we have the fol-
lowing, as desired:
1/2 · OPT(v(r)) ≤ OPT(v(r′)) ≤ 3/2 · OPT(v(r)). 
Corollary A.3.4. If N ≥ 2 log(4m2k·η−1)
δ2(logm)2 and k ≥ 32 log(8η
−1)




1/k · OPT(v(r)) ≤ γ ≤ 12/k · OPT(v(r)) ,
with probability at least 1 − η.
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APPENDIX B
OMITTED PROOFS FROM CHAPTER 4
B.1 Missing Proofs from Section 4.3.1
Lemma 4.3.2. The value of program (P4), denoted by ρ′, is an upper bound on the
value of program (P3) which is ρ.





i > 1. We construct a corresponding assignment (v¯, q¯) which is feasi-







i which then implies that BOUNDI ≤ BOUNDII . Without loss of generality






i > 1. Observe






i . Observe that
0 ≤ δ < v¯′jq¯′j. We construct a new optimal assignment (v¯, q¯) by setting for each
i ∈ {2, . . . , n}:
v¯i =

v¯′j+i−2 2 ≤ i ≤ n − j + 2
1 n − j + 3 ≤ i ≤ n
q¯i =

q¯′j − δv¯′j i = 2
q¯′j+i−2 3 ≤ i ≤ n − j + 2
0 n − j + 3 ≤ i ≤ n
.








i . So we





i , so the second constraint holds. So we only need to show that
(v¯, q¯) satisfies the constraint (P4.1).
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By rearranging (P3.1) we get∏
i:v¯′i≥p
1 + v¯′i q¯′ip · (1 − q¯′i)
 ≤ ( pp − 1
)
∀p > 0.
We then relax the previous inequality by dropping the term (1 − q¯′i) from the















∀p > 0. (B.1)



























∀k ∈ {2, . . . , n} . (B.2)
Observe that for any given k the the right hand side of (B.2) is equal or less than





















∀k ∈ {2, . . . , n} .
We can then further relax the above inequality by replacing the terms ln(1 + v¯iq¯iv¯k )
with 1v¯k ln(1 + v¯iq¯i) and rearranging the terms to get the constraint (P4.1) which
implies that (v¯, q¯) is feasible with respect to that constraint as well. 
Lemma 4.3.4. The functionsV(p), Q(p), andV(p) − Q(p) are all decreasing in p, for
p > 1.








p2 − 1 <
1
p2 − 1 −
2
p2 − 1 < 0.
The first inequality uses the fact that ln(1+ x) ≤ x. Similarly Q(p) is also decreas-




1We invoke Lemma B.1.1 by setting b = 1v¯k , a =
v¯2q¯2
v¯k







Lemma 4.3.5. V(p) −V(p′) < ln( pp−1 ) − ln( p
′
p′−1 ) for any p
′ > p > 1.
Proof. Define G(p) = V(p) − ln( pp−1 ). Observe that proving the inequality in the
statement of the lemma is equivalent to proving G(p) < G(p′) which we do by










We will show that G′(p) is decreasing which then implies G′(p) > 0 because
limp→∞G′(p) = 0. Therefore we only need to show that G′′(p) < 0.
G′′(p) =
−(3p + 1)
(p − 1)p2(p + 1)2 < 0.

Lemma B.1.1. Consider any a, b, z1, . . . , zm ≥ 0 such that a + b = ∑mi=1 zi and a ≤ zm ≤
b. Then




Proof. We can re-write the equation as
ln
(
(1 + a)(1 + b)
) ≤ ln m∏
i=1















≥ (1 + a)(1 + b),
138
where the first inequality follows by eliminating some terms from the ex-
pansion of
∏m
i=1(1 + zi), and the second inequality from the assumption that
(1 + a) ≤ (1 + zm) and (1 + b) ≥ (1 + ∑m−1i=1 zi). 
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APPENDIX C
OMITTED PROOFS AND DISCUSSIONS FROM CHAPTER 5
C.1 Other Deferred Proofs and Discussions
C.1.1 Discussion on choice of pi for bandit symmetric range
We now describe how the choice of initial distribution pi affects the bound given
in Theorem 5.2.7.
• When the action set is finite, we can choose pi to be the uniform distribution






This recovers the standard bound by setting ci = cmax for all i ∈ A.








j∈A c j/cmin) · ci
)
. In particular, if the








• If there are infinitely many experts but ∑i∈A c−1i is convergent, e.g., ci =



















C.1.2 Log factor for symmetric range - proof of Theorem 5.2.9
Proof of Theorem 5.2.9. We first show that for any online learning algorithm, and
any sufficiently large h > 1, there is an instance that has two experts with c1 = 1
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5h log2 h .
We will construct this instance with T = 12 log2 h − 1 rounds adaptively that al-
ways has gain 0 for action 1 and gain either h or −h for action 2. The proof of
the theorem then follows as cmin = 1, cmax = h, T = 12 log2 h − 1, and k = 2 in this
instance. Let qt denote the probability that the algorithm picks action 2 in round
t after having the same rewards 1 and h for the two actions respectively in the
first t−1 rounds. We will first show that (1) if the algorithm has small regret with
respect to action 1, then qt must be upper bounded since the adversary may let
action 2 have cost −h in any round t in which qt is too large. Then, we will show
that (2) since qt is upper bounded for any 1 ≤ t ≤ T , the algorithm must have
large regret with respect to action 2.
We proceed with the upper bounding qt’s. Concretely, we will show the
following lemma.
Lemma C.1.1. Suppose EREGRET1[≤] 12T+
√
h. Then, for any 1 ≤ t ≤ T , we have qt ≤ 2t√h .
Proof of Lemma C.1.1. We will prove by induction on t. Consider the base case
t = 1. Suppose for contradiction that q1 > 2√h . Then, consider an instance in
which action 2 always has gain. In this case, the expected gain of the algorithm
(even if it always correctly picks action 1 in the remaining instance) is at most
q1 · (−h) < −2
√




Next, suppose the lemma holds for all rounds prior to round t. Then, the
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expected gain of algorithm in the first t − 1 rounds if arm 2 has gain H is
t−1∑
`=1










Suppose for contradiction that qt > 2
t√
h
. Then, consider an instance in which
action 2 has gain H in the first t − 1 rounds and −H afterwards. In this case, the
expected gain of the algorithm (even if it always correctly picks action 1 after










h < −2√h .





Consider an instance in which action 2 always has gain H. Suppose that
EREGRET1[≤] 12T +
√
h. As an immediate implication of the above lemma, the algo-










h = h .
Note that in this instance EG2[=]T ·h. Thus, the regret w.r.t. action 2 is at least
(T − 1)h, which is greater than 12 · EG2[+] 15h log2 h for sufficiently large h. 
C.1.3 Regret lower-bound for symmetric range -proof of Theo-
rem 5.2.12
Proof of Theorem 5.2.12. We first show that for any online multi-scale bandits al-
gorithm problem, and there is an instance that has two arms with c1 = 1 and












We will prove the existence of this instance by looking at the stochastic setting,
i.e., the gain vectors g(t)’s are i.i.d. for 1 ≤ t ≤ T . We consider two instances,
both of which admit a fixed gain of 0 for action 1. In the first instance, the gain
of action 2 is h with probability 12 − 2, and −h otherwise. Hence, the expected
gain of playing action 2 is −4h per round in instance 1. In the second instance,
the gain of action 2 is h with probability 12 + 2, and −h otherwise. Hence, the
expected gain of playing action two is 4h per round in instance 2. Note this
proves the theorem, as cmin = 1, cmax = h, k = 2 and and T = h2562 .
Suppose for contradiction that the algorithm satisfies:
EREGRET1[≤] T + 1256h = 1128h , EREGRET2[≤] hT + 1256h2 = 1128h2 .
Let N1 denote the expected number of times that the algorithm plays action
2 in instance 1. Then, the expected regret with respect to action 1 in instance 1 is
N1 · 4h. By the assumption that EREGRET1[≤] 1128h, we have N1 ≤ 15122 .
Next, by standard calculation, we get that the Kullback-Leibler (KL) diver-
gence of the observed rewards in a single round in the two instances is 0 if action
1 is played and is at most 642 (for 0 <  < 0.1) if action 2 is played. So the KL
divergence of the observed reward sequences in the two instances is at most
642 · N1 ≤ 18 .
Then, we use a standard inequality about KL divergences. For any measur-














. For any 1 ≤ t ≤ T , let ρ1 and ρ2 be the distribution of ob-
143
served rewards up to a round t in the two instances, and let ψ(X) be the ac-
tion played by the algorithm. By this inequality and the above bound on the
KL divergence between the observed rewards in the two instances, we get that
in each round, the probability that the algorithm plays action 2 in instance 1,
plus the probability that the algorithm plays action 1 in instance 2, is at least
1
2 exp (−18 ) > 25 in any round t. Thus, the expected number of times that the
algorithm plays action 1 in instance 2 from round 1 to T , denoted as N2, is
at least N2 ≥ 25 · T − N1 ≥ 13 · T , where the second inequality holds for suffi-
ciently large h. Therefore, the expected regret w.r.t. action 2 in instance 2 is at
least: 4h · 13 · T = 43hT > 1128h2. This is a contradiction to our assumption that
EREGRET2[≤] 1128h2. 
C.1.4 Proof of Lemma 5.3.3
Proof of Lemma 5.3.3. We have:
∑
i∈A
qi ·Gi − EGALG[=]
∑
t∈[T ]
q · g(t) −
∑
t∈[T ]








By applying the regret bound of OMD (Lemma 2.4.1) to upper-bound the RHS,
we have ∑
i∈A








To bound the first term in regret, a.k.a local norm, we have:
DF(p(t),w(t + 1)) =
∑
i∈A









Note that η · gi(t)ci ∈ [−1, 1] because gi(t) ∈ [−ci, ci] and 0 < η ≤ 1. By exp(x)− x− 1 ≤






. We can also rewrite the second term in regret. In fact, if we set
p(1) = µ, then
1
η











− qi + µi
)





on each term of local norm in
(C.3) for t ∈ [T ] and putting all the pieces together, we get the desired bound. 
We also provide an elementary proof of this lemma using first principles.
Proof of Lemma 5.3.3 from first principles. By using update rule of Algorithm 5,
we have gi(t) = ciη log(
wi(t+1)
pi(t)





















































ci · qi · log











Now, note that due to the normalization step of Algorithm 5, for any i ∈ S
we have:
ci · log(wi(t + 1)pi(t + 1) ) = λ =
∑
j∈A
c j · p j(t + 1) · λc j =
∑
j∈A
c j · p j(t + 1) · log(w j(t + 1)p j(t + 1) )
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So the first summation in (C.4) is equal to:∑
i∈S


















ci · pi(t + 1) · log(wi(t + 1)pi(t + 1) ) (C.5)






















ci · qi · log
( pi(t + 1)
pi(t)
)
The second part is a telescopic sum when we sum over t. We will upper































) − pi(t) + wi(t + 1)
)
Again, the first part is a telescopic sum when we sum over t. We will further

















Note that η · gi(t)ci ∈ [−1, 1] because gi(t) ∈ [−ci, ci] and 0 < η ≤ 1. By exp(x) − x −


















( pi(t + 1)
pi(t)
)





















( pi(T + 1)
pi(1)
)









































The lemma then follows by our choice of the initial distribution. 
C.1.5 Proof of OMD regret bound
In order to prove the OMD regret bound, we need some properties of Bregman
divergence.
Lemma C.1.2 (Properties of Bregman divergence (Bubeck, 2011)). Suppose F(·)
is a Legendre function and DF(·, ·) is its associated Bregman divergence as defined in
Definition 2.4.1. Then:
• DF(x, y) > 0 if x , y as F is strictly convex, and DF(x, x) = 0.
• DF(., y) is a convex function for any choice of y.
• (Pythagorean theorem) If A is a convex set, a ∈ A, b < A and c =
argmin x ∈ ADF(x, b), then
DF(a, c) + DF(c, b) ≤ DF(a, b)
Given Lemma C.1.2, we are now ready to prove Lemma 2.4.1.
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Proof of Lemma 2.4.1. To obtain the OMD regret bound, we have:
q · g(t) − p(t) · g(t) = 1
η




(DF(qb,p(t)) + DF(p(t),w(t + 1)) − DF(qb,w(t + 1)))
(1)≤ 1
η




DF(q,p(t)) − DF(q,p(t + 1))) (C.6)
where in inequality (1) we use the facts that DF(p(t + 1),w(t + 1)) ≥ 0 and
DF(q,p(t + 1)) + DF(p(t + 1),w(t + 1)) ≤ DF(q,w(t + 1)) due to Pythagorean the-
















C.1.6 Symmetric range bandit regret - proof of Lemma 5.3.6
Proof of Lemma 5.3.6. We further define:
G˜ALG ,
∑
t∈[T ] git(t) =
∑
t∈[T ] p˜(t) · g˜(t) ,
G˜ j ,
∑
t∈[T ] g˜ j(t) .














for any j ∈ A.







By the definition of the probability that the algorithm picks each arm, i.e.,





≥ (1 − γ)
∑
t∈[T ]
p(t) · g˜(t) − γTcmax .
Hence, for any benchmark distribution q over A, we have that:
∑
j∈A










j∈A q j · G˜ j −∑t∈[T ] p(t) · g˜(t)] + γ1−γE [G˜ALG] + γ1−γTcmax
≤ E
[∑
j∈A q j · G˜ j −∑t∈[T ] p(t) · g˜(t)] + 2γE [G˜ALG] + 2γTcmax
≤ E
[∑
j∈A q j · G˜ j −∑t∈[T ] p(t) · g˜(t)] + 4γTcmax . (C.8)
where the second inequality is due to γ ≤ 12 , and the 3rd inequality follows by
that cmax is the largest possible reward per round.
Next, we upper bound the first term on the RHS of (C.8). Note that p(t)’s are
the probability of choosing experts by MSMW when the experts have rewards
g˜(t)’s. By Lemma 5.3.3, we have that for any benchmark distribution q over S ,























q j ln ( q jp j(1)) − q j + p j(1)
 .
(C.9)
For any t ∈ [T ] and any j ∈ A, by the definition of g˜ j(t), it equals g j(t)p˜ j(t) with
probability p˜ j(t), and equals 0 otherwise. Thus, if we fix the random coin flips in
the first t−1 rounds and, thus, fix p˜(t), and take expectation over the randomness
in round t, we have that:
E
 p j(t)c j · (g˜ j(t))2
 = p j(t)c j · p˜ j(t) ·
g j(t)p˜ j(t)





Further note that p˜ j(t) ≥ (1 − γ)p j(t), and |g j(t)| ≤ c j, the above is upper
bounded by 11−γ |g j(t)| ≤ 2|g j(t)| ≤ 2cmax. Putting together with (C.9), we have that


























q j ln ( q jp j(1)) − q j + p j(1)

Combining with (C.8), we have (recall that η ≤ γk ):∑
j∈A




















q j ln ( q jp j(1)) − q j + p j(1)
 + 6γTcmax
Let q = (1 − γ)1i + γk1. Recall that p(1) = (1 − γ)1imin + γk1 (recall imin is the
arm with minimum range cimin). Similar to the discussion for the expert problem

































+ 6γTcmax . (C.10)
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